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Osakkeiden omistusrakenne on kokenut suuria muutoksia viime vuosikymmeninä, kun passiiviset 
sijoitusmuodot ovat kasvattaneet omistustaan. Passiivisen sijoittamisen ominaisuuksiin kuuluu sen 
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ennen tulevan indeksipoiston ilmoittamista markkinoille, mikä implikoi sitä, että aktiiviset sijoittajat ovat 
halukkaampia tekemään suurempia ennustavia sijoituksia sellaisia osakkeita vastaan, joilla on aikaisemmin 
ollut enemmän passiivisten instituutioiden aihettamaa ei-fundamentaalista ostopainetta. Tämä havainto on 
konsistentti sen ajatuksen kanssa, että jokainen passiivinen dollari saattaa lisätä jotain ekstraa osakkeiden 
arvostustasoihin ja että aktiivinen raha ja arbitraasi on rajoitettua korjaamaan nämä vaikutukset lyhyellä 
aikavälillä. 
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I – Introduction 
 
Passive investing is a megatrend of the stock markets. Since 2007 the AUM of passive equity 
vehicles has grown globally by 230% to over 6 trillion dollars1 and is expected to climb even 
more in the future with projections showing that they will overtake actively managed assets no 
later than 20242. The main reasons behind this shift has been the introduction of cheap and 
simple index tracking exchange traded funds (ETFs) and mutual funds, favourable regulation 
and enhanced technology3. The growth has not only come from new capital, but also at the 
expense of active funds, i.e. funds that purposely deviate from their benchmark indices in the 
search of excess returns, or alpha. From a theoretical standpoint, this move has been sensible 
as it is a pure mathematical fact that active investing is a zero-sum game and after fees, which 
are typically high, it is a negative sum game (Sharpe, 1991). So, holding all else constant, the 
average investor is usually better off investing in passive funds over time. Purchases by passive 
institutions don’t rely on any firm-specific fundamental analysis, however, which is why in 
excessive quantities it is possible that their actions can decrease the accuracy of stock prices. 
Active money, or the so called “smart money”, on the other hand has an extremely important 
function in the capital markets: they use large amounts of resources on research to estimate the 
real, fundamental values of stocks and act on this gained knowledge. In doing so they push the 
prices of stocks closer towards their fundamental values, add liquidity and bring markets closer 
to efficiency, i.e. a situation where the prices of stocks reflect all the relevant information in the 
markets but nothing more (Fama, 1970). Perfect efficiency of prices is arguably impossible 
though (Grossman and Stigliz, 1980), and history shows that there have been situations where 
active investors have been unable to bring efficiency due to so called limits on arbitrage, or 
somewhat paradoxically they have been uninformed and thus unable to push prices back to their 
fundamental values. These notions raise an important research question regarding the short and 
long-term effects caused by non-fundamental flows of passive investors. 
Research around the growth of passivity is still rather young and to the best of my knowledge 
there are two notable papers, by Qin and Singal (2015) and Coles et al. (2018), where the actual 
amount and the share of passive money aggregated from ETF and mutual fund ownerships is 
used to study the effects of passivity. The results from both of these papers are supportive of 
                                                          
1 Financial Times 05/16: https://www.ft.com/content/2552ce62-2400-11e6-aa98-db1e01fabc0c  
2 Moody’s 02/17 
3 Credit Suisse 01/17 
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decreased weak-form price efficiency as a result of passivity but they disagree in terms of the 
effects on semi-strong efficiency, implying that further research around the topic is required. 
Therefore, in this master’s thesis, I form time-series of passivity for individual stocks by 
aggregating the ownership of passive vehicles (index funds and exchange-traded funds) and 
analyse whether the quarterly flows and level of passivity alter the returns characteristics of 
stocks.  
I find a statistically significant negative, though small, effect of passivity on the realized 
quarterly idiosyncratic skewness, and further analysis indicates that it is due to an elevated 
realized idiosyncratic negative deviation, consistent with the idea that increases in passive 
ownership are associated with higher reversals due to passivity’s initial positive effect on prices 
and subsequent corrections induced by active investors.  
Additionally, I study the cross-section of stocks by running the same regressions by group, 
formed from the level of realized return on equity (ROE) and find that passivity’s effects are 
more prominent for stocks that have worse fundamentals, implying that the added non-
fundamental buying pressure of passive institutions may have larger effects for stocks that 
wouldn’t perhaps otherwise be in much demand by investors, and have hence a higher share of 
non-fundamental trading out of the total trading conducted.  
Finally, I study the potential long-term effects of passivity by forming event studies around 
index-deletions and find that the lagged level of passive ownership is a meaningful factor in 
explaining the abnormal returns around the deletions. Interestingly, the explanatory power of 
passive ownership is most prominent especially in the window leading up to the announcement 
of the index-deletion, implying that active investors may be more willing to take larger 
anticipatory bets against stocks that have had more non-fundamental flows by passive 
institutions in the past, consistent with the notion that each passive dollar may be adding 
something extra to the valuation levels of stocks and that arbitrageurs are limited in their 
capabilities in fixing this in the short-term. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II further covers the previous 
literature and motives behind this thesis, in Section III is described the hypotheses to be tested, 
Section IV covers the methodology and data of the tests, Section V includes the results of the 
tests whereas further robustness is tested and limitations discussed in Section VI. Finally, in 
section VII, I discuss the concluding remarks and suggestions for future research. 
3 
 
II – Motives and previous literature 
 
 
What is passive investing? 
 
First it is essential to specify what passive investing really is and what the different forms of it 
are. The most significant form is index funds and ETFs, and I define them as vehicles that 
mechanically follow indices that are simply formed by market cap, equal weighting or other 
non-fundamental reason. That is, when investors invest in passive funds, the funds channel the 
investments to individual stocks based on the stocks’ relative weight in the index that the fund 
is tracking. Therefore, passive investing takes no view on the valuation of individual stocks or 
how they are valued relative to other stocks, but rather accepts the current levels and their 
relative weightings. Prior to index funds, if investors wanted to own passive portfolios, they 
had to do it themselves by observing the stock valuations, forming portfolios and rebalancing 
at predetermined intervals, which of course requires high amounts of capital and is very 
expensive. Whereas passive investing through index funds is a cheap way to own diversified 
portfolios and doesn’t require much capital, which makes it attractive and is perhaps the main 
reason behind the growth of indexing in recent years.  
Additionally, there are individual investors and institutions such as pension funds or even 
central banks4 that build portfolios in a very similar manner as passive index funds. On top of 
this, even some active funds may have large positions that could be classified as being passive 
which is to some extent confirmed by Wermers and Yao (2010) who show that active funds 
tend to own a lot of the same stocks with similar weights as passive funds. Furthermore, in 
recent years there has been significant amount of mechanical stock buybacks by companies 
themselves, some of which can be thought of as another form of added passive ownership and 
a non-fundamental pressure for prices5.  
Finally, there are other types of funds that mechanically track indices, but the indices 
themselves are formed from other criteria than purely market capitalization, such as value, 
                                                          
4 For example, the Central Banks of Switzerland and Japan have been big net purchasers of equities for some 
time now, although they mostly invest via ETFs: https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnmauldin/2017/06/22/the-
swiss-national-bank-owns-80-billion-in-us-stocks-heres-the-catch/#4e2924875362 & 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-07-19/japan-bourse-head-turns-surprise-critic-of-kuroda-etf-
purchases  
5 Buybacks also automatically increase the share of total shares owned by passive institutions because companies 
purchase the stocks from active investors. 
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growth momentum or volatility. These are the so called “factor” funds or “smart beta” funds 
that combine both passive and active investing, which is why they can’t simply be classified to 
either group. Clearly the passivity classification for these other types of methods is rather 
difficult, but it nonetheless poses an interesting question about how much “pure” passivity there 
really is if we could accurately estimate it all. 
 
Stock market efficiency 
 
Studies about stock market efficiency are at the heart of academic finance and they are 
traditionally traced back to the paper by Fama (1970)6  who proposed a framework for assessing 
the level of market efficiency and argued that the stock markets are highly efficient in the sense 
that no investor can consistently achieve positive risk-adjusted returns. This argument came to 
be called as “the efficient market hypothesis” (EMH) and it was followed by various papers 
where its sensibility was tested.  
Many of these papers documented “anomalies” that were inconsistent with the EMH such as 
returns predictability through PE-ratios (Basu, 1977), size (Banz, 1981), excess volatility of 
stock prices inconsistent with efficient incorporation of new information (Shiller, 1981) return 
reversals due to overreaction and behavioural biases (DeBondt and Thaler, 1985) and various 
papers about stock market seasonality (eg. DeBondt and Thaler, 1987). Perhaps the most 
convincing argument against EMH was formulated by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) who 
argued that it is in fact impossible to have perfectly efficient markets, because gathering 
information is costly and investors will not conduct research without an expected payoff. In 
other words, if prices perfectly reflected all the available relevant information at all times, 
investors couldn’t gain abnormal returns by analysing firms and therefore no one would do it. 
On the other hand, if no one did any research, the markets couldn’t be very accurate. Therefore, 
for the expected payoff to exist, there needs to be some inefficiencies in the market. 
In the context of this paper, if perfect market efficiency applied, everyone should invest 
passively and be satisfied with the market returns, because consistent risk-adjusted 
outperformance would be impossible and being active wouldn’t bring efficiency to the markets. 
But as per the argument by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980), perfect efficiency is impossible 
                                                          
6 His paper was actually a review of the theory and evidence released up to that point, but he was the first to tie 
them together and formalize a comprehensive framework. 
5 
 
because we need research and incentives to research to get closer to efficient prices. Therefore, 
full passivity is an impossibility and one can question the sensibility of the current trend towards 
higher passivity and less research-based investing.  
 
Why passivity matters? 
 
Sharpe’s (1991) insight was that the stock market simply consists of two groups: passive 
investors and active investors. The difference between these groups is that passive investors 
hold the market (index) with equal portfolios whereas active investors each individually deviate 
from this with different portfolio weights. However, the active investors must collectively 
match the portfolio of the passive group and thus each group earns the market return on 
aggregate. Within the active group, the investors’ returns vary greatly due to unique weights: 
i.e. when one investor overweights a stock relative to a stock’s weight in the passive portfolio, 
another investor or a group of investors must underweight it in a similar fashion, hence the 
characterization “zero-sum game”. And because the active investors pay higher fees due to 
trading and various other costs, their return on aggregate always loses to the return of the 
passive investors (Figure 1).  
 
 
Figure 1: Sharpe’s (1991) Arithmetic of active management visualized. The trend of passive flows can in this 
context alter market efficiency in two ways: 1. through the non-fundamental push of passive mechanical flows 
and 2. by altering the composition of the various active investors that would otherwise trade inefficiencies away. 
 
In the simplified model depicted in Figure 1, if we accept that skill is involved in the returns of 
the active investors, i.e. the markets are not perfectly efficient and skilled investors can 
consistently pick good stocks over bad stocks, it is intuitive to think that over time the least 
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skilled of the active group will exit the market completely or will switch to the passive group. 
This is because for the skilled to gain, the less skilled have to pay for it. Thus, when the average 
skill-level of the active group increases, it becomes increasingly difficult for active investors to 
outperform their peers and possibly even to find counterparties that are willing to trade stocks 
that they perceive to be mispriced. Therefore, the active part of the market requires sufficient 
enough amount of dispersion in the views of individual investors so that the most “skilled” 
investors can have the possibility to express their views about corporate valuations. In this 
context, the level and flows of passive ownership can alter market efficiency in two ways: first, 
by causing a non-fundamental push to the prices when they make investment decisions that 
aren’t based on any research, and second, by altering the size and composition of the active 
group who normally corrects any deviations from fundamental values.  
Furthermore, another intuitive way to think about passivity's potential adverse effects is to 
wonder what would happen at the limit, i.e. in a situation where stocks are completely or almost 
completely owned by passive institutions: first, new information wouldn't directly be 
incorporated to stock prices because passive institutions do not trade on fundamentals, they act 
only on investor subscriptions or redemptions, thus the valuations of fully passivized stocks 
would be fixed until perpetuity and hence they would in many ways mirror unlisted and 
untradeable stocks. This situation would likely be reached even in the case of “almost” full 
passivity, for active investors always require other active investors to trade with.  
Clearly in these scenarios the stock markets would effectively stop working and this is not in 
any way sensible or possible which is why the cap for passivity must be somewhere 
significantly below 100%, as was similarly noted by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). This notion 
also relates to the hypothesis by Pedersen (2018), who discusses how too high levels of passivity 
would lead to illiquidity in the secondary markets, increased cost of capital for firms and less 
informative stock prices. Throley (1999) also argued that if all investors were rational, they 
should only invest actively if they were in the top 25% of all investors because so many 
underperform the market over time. He then discusses that in a world of rational investors only 
the very best would stay active which would eventually lead to the diminishing of liquidity. His 
conclusion is that due to the overconfidence of many investors, they perceive themselves as 
belonging to the top 25% and therefore decide to stay active, which ultimately increases the 
liquidity of the markets and allows the truly skilled investors to enhance market efficiency.   
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Therefore, if we know for sure that full or very high amount of passivity will be bad for market 
efficiency, then one can hypothesize that getting closer to the limit may also be bad for 
efficiency (incremental deterioration). On the other hand, one could of course see passivity as 
a binary problem where we only observe the negative effects once a critical limit in passivity 
has been reached, i.e. when the amount of active investors is so low that trading becomes barely 
existent. Nevertheless, finding whether the negative effects of passivity on market efficiency 
are incremental or fully binary is an extremely important question for the future of the whole 
stock market itself to ensure efficient channelling of capital in the economy. 
 
Previous literature 
 
In theory, passive investing should only work as a follower of the markets, accept that the 
valuations driven by active investors are rational and hence have no price impact. However, 
many studies (Chang et al., 2015; Petajisto, 2011; Sullivan & Xiong, 2012) have shown how 
stocks that are added to an index experience a boost in their prices and increased co-movement 
with other constituents of the index, and how index deletions lead to opposite reactions. This is 
due to the fact that passive funds following the index are forced to buy the newly added stocks 
and sell the deleted ones because their goal is to simply track the performance of the index. 
Added co-movement comes from the fact that index funds trade the index constituents as a 
basket, meaning that for every additional dollar they receive from investors, they buy all (or a 
representative group) of the stocks within the index at their respective weights regardless of 
how the fundamentals for the companies look like.  
The key insights from these papers are that the price movements resulting from being in an 
index are non-fundamental7, i.e. it doesn’t bring any new information and thus should have 
nothing to do with the valuation of the company8 and that there is a downward-slope in the 
demand curve for stocks. Over time, if active investors are for some reason unable to reverse 
the valuation increases caused by passive money (they may for example fear that the flow of 
new passive capital will drive the mispricing even higher), the most highly indexed and 
“passivized” stocks can become overvalued. This is characterized by for example Wurgler 
                                                          
7 Important notion in this context is that there are now actually more indices than stocks: 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-12/there-are-now-more-indexes-than-stocks 
8 Although one could argue that being in an index can increase the liquidity for a stock as there are so many 
index funds trading them and that the added liquidity should warrant a premium. 
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(2010) as “detachment” and there are studies that show how this can already be a reality (Morck 
& Yang, 2001; Belasco et al., 2011). 
The research on the effects of passive money is still very young and the amount of papers 
released is limited, but it is growing very quickly. The paper closest to this thesis is by Qin and 
Singal (2015) who find that stocks with higher passive ownership have stronger post-earnings 
announcement drift (PEAD) and deviate more from the random walk, implying decreased weak 
and semi-strong price efficiency. Later Coles et al. (2018) have also shown using regression 
discontinuity –methodology in Russell 1000 & 2000 -indices, that passivity is associated with 
a lower tendency for stocks to follow a random walk, but their results were contradictory to 
those of Qin and Singal (2015) in terms of the PEAD effects, and they concluded that the 
adverse effects from passivity are only apparent in the weak-form price efficiency. This 
contradictory finding gives room for further research around long-term pricing effects and 
abnormalities for heavily passivized stocks.  
In other contexts, Ben David et al. (2014) find that stocks with higher ETF ownership have 
higher volatility, higher mean reversion and higher tail risk at times of market stress, suggesting 
that ETF inflows impound non-fundamental shocks to the underlying securities. Baltussen et 
al. (2017) find supporting evidence that the serial dependence (autocorrelation) of indices 
around the world has systematically turned negative and they argue that this is because high 
levels of indexing has started to drive prices which are then to some extent corrected by 
arbitrageurs.  
Furthermore, Israeli et al. (2017) show that increased ETF ownership leads to higher trading 
costs for the underlying securities, increased co-movement among stocks, decreased predictive 
power of firm-level stock returns on future earnings9 and a decrease in the amount of analysts 
following the firm, all supportive of declined pricing efficiency. Glosten et al. (2016) on the 
other hand find that for stocks in weak informational environments, ETF ownership actually 
somewhat increases the pricing efficiency as it correctly impounds systematic earnings 
information in to these stocks.  
Passively managed funds have not only taken market share due to their lower fees and 
simplicity, but probably more importantly because their performance has been so good relative 
                                                          
9 This is shown by Durnev et al. (2003): greater firm-specific volatility is associated with more informative stock 
prices. 
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to most active funds. In recent years, as much as 80-90% of active funds have lost to their 
benchmark indices regardless of fund type which is why many investors have likely switched 
to passive funds10. Arguably active fund managers possess a lot of skill and as per Sharpe (1991) 
they should on aggregate earn the same return as the passive funds, so it is an interesting 
question why so many perform poorly relative to the market.  One reason that is also consistent 
with the detachment hypothesis is that due to the large inflows of passive money, there is a low 
frequency positive feedback loop in heavily indexed stocks that drives the performance of 
passive funds.  
More accurately: each dollar invested in index funds is invested in the basket that they follow, 
pushing the underlying stocks higher and making the performance look good, which in turn 
attracts even more capital and allows the index funds to lower their fees11, again leading to more 
capital invested and higher performance of the funds (Figure 2). And because it is the active 
investors from which the passive funds purchase the shares from, the relative performance 
difference can be attributed to the feedback loop of passivity12. If the hypothesized feedback 
loop of passivity continues going on, many active managers will keep suffering in performance 
versus the indices. 
The loop described here is of course relevant only if there are impediments for arbitrageurs to 
reverse the effects on prices and that the demand curve for these stocks is steep enough that 
these passive demand shocks affect prices. In any case, the positive feedback loop is a rather 
plausible process through which the mispricing of the indexed stocks could come from and it 
relates to previous studies about fund flows as predictors of future performance (Warther, 1995; 
Coval & Stafford, 200713; Staer, 2017) and returns chasing of investors (Sapp & Tiwari, 2004).  
At the very least, it is rather intuitive to think that heavily indexed stocks are unlikely to be 
undervalued because the same limits on arbitrage wouldn’t apply, i.e. arbitrageurs would 
quickly buy the stocks because they would ultimately be backed by the seemingly ever-
increasing passive money flowing in to the index funds. However, if the loop ever turned 
negative, i.e. systematic outflows from passive funds, this could be the case. This possibility 
                                                          
10 Standard & Poors 12/16 
11 This is because they gather the fees as a % of the total AUM. 
12 In other words, passive institutions are gaining ownership from the high performing indexed stocks whereas 
active investors are losing the ownership, leading to a relative performance gap between the two groups. 
13 Coval and Stafford (2007) show how large inflows/outflows result in positive/negative pricing pressure for a 
fund’s existing  positions. 
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was also recently noted by JP Morgan (2018)14, and as a result the bank has begun advising 
their clients against investing in highly passivized stocks.  
 
 
Figure 2: Positive feedback loop through which passive management can drive prices.  
Note that the process only works if there are sufficient limits to arbitrage. 
 
Another topic regarding market efficiency is the idea about the loss of “the wisdom of the 
crowds” -effect which effectively means that as more and more investors pool their capital in 
to index funds, a lot of relevant latent information about the underlying stocks may be lost from 
the markets.  
For example, The Bank of America frequently releases a report on their estimates on the share 
of active vs passive in the markets, and their latest report shows that their customers’ cumulative 
net flows since 2007 to ETFs (thereby excluding mutual funds) has been around +$200bn vs -
$350bn to direct stock purchases, implying that if direct trades by individuals include relevant 
information, this will likely disappear from the markets. The wisdom of the crowds may work 
well in many situations, but it is obviously quite difficult to test in the context of the stock 
                                                          
14 Bloomberg 10/2018: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-10-24/jpmorgan-sees-7-4-trillion-
passive-selling-pressure-in-downturn 
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markets, though Chen et al. (2014) find supporting evidence for the wisdom through social 
media -postings, showing how aggregate opinions can predict stock returns and earnings 
surprises.  
However, contrary to the findings above, it could be argued that many or most of the investors 
who have gone passive are “noise traders”15 who shouldn’t even be trading the stocks directly 
and thus the prices of the underlying stocks will actually be more efficient as the share of 
informed traders is higher in setting the prices. This would likely be true if the passive vehicles 
had no price impact, i.e. if they were truly just following the index. But in reality, as is shown 
in the research cited previously, there are price impacts which may be quite sticky through the 
increased co-movement and the feedback loop hypothesized in Figure 2, which is why the 
hypothesis about increased efficiency is somewhat problematic. Furthermore, as was discussed 
earlier, the fact that the average skill level of the active investors grows as the less skilled turn 
to passive funds may not necessarily be a good thing regarding pricing efficiency for it may 
lead to a lack of counterparties for the arbitrageurs when we get close to very high levels of 
passive ownership.  
Before forming the hypotheses of this thesis, a more detailed look at the arbitrageurs and their 
limits is required. In the classical finance theory, arbitrageurs eliminate all pricing inefficiencies 
with little to no lag and can enter an infinite amount of arbitrage opportunities, eliminating the 
idiosyncratic risks they carry in the process. However, in practice arbitrage requires large 
amounts of capital which is usually externally sourced and thus under high scrutiny, it is risky 
and is usually conducted by specialized arbitrageurs that take large individual positions 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; De Long et al., 1990).  
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) also add that arbitrage is notoriously difficult in the equity markets 
as stocks are typically hard to value and the markets may stay inefficient even for long time-
periods. This is supported by Wermers and Yao (2010) who find that high levels of passive 
mutual fund ownership in stocks leads to prolonged pricing anomalies which is evidence for 
active investors’ unwillingness to trade these stocks and Petajisto (2010) who analyses the NAV 
deviations of ETFs relative to their holdings and concludes that at least some of the difference 
comes from high limits on arbitrage. In this context, it is plausible to think how arbitrageurs 
might want to avoid trading against the most heavily indexed stocks because the trend has 
                                                          
15 This is a popular characterization by Fisher Black (1986) for unskilled individual investors that trade purely on 
noise, i.e. market movements. 
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clearly been so strong towards passive investing. Nevertheless, the longer and the more 
prominent the potential pricing inefficiencies become, the better the expected payoff of trading 
against the inefficiencies become. Over very long periods the markets should thus always 
converge towards efficient prices, so long as there are sufficient amounts of research and capital 
willing to trade stocks. 
Additionally, and somewhat unintuitively, even active managers may be incentivized to trade 
with the flow of passive money instead of against it: as is discussed by Baker et al. (2011), 
active managers benchmarked against a simple index are more likely to pick high beta stocks 
regardless of their potential alpha16, because it yields better results in terms of the information 
ratio17. In other words, stocks that have received an artificial bump in their betas due to the 
increased co-movement are more favourable investments regardless of their fundamentals. 
Also, if there truly is a positive feedback loop of passivity as characterized in Figure 2 then if 
active investors are aware of it and understand that it warrants a premium to passivized stocks, 
then they may take positions purely as a result of the fact that there is non-fundamental demand 
for these stocks.  
Noteworthy is however, that the lending supply required for shorting indexed stocks is likely 
rather large as index funds tend to be quite willing to lend their positions with relatively low 
fees and they are also a favourable counterparty for the borrowers in terms of recall risk 
(D’Avolio, 2002), implying that shorting these stocks shouldn’t be that difficult. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16 Potential alpha can be characterized as the perceived mispricing of a stock by an active manager. 
17 They discuss how maximizing Sharpe ratio (excess returns over risk-free rate) instead of information ratio 
(excess return over tracking error) would yield better results in terms of performance. 
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III – Hypotheses 
 
 
If the detachment hypothesis discussed above is true and that the non-fundamental flows from 
passive investors affects prices, over time we should see at least some reversals in prices 
because arbitrageurs are not fully limited in their actions and the markets will converge towards 
efficiency over time. The reversals could be due to fundamental information being released that 
doesn’t support the slow and steady non-fundamental push of passive money, hypothesized in 
Figure 2, and the idea is that once the market as a whole sees the potential pricing failure, the 
reversal is much more likely than when only hypothesized by smart money. I do not necessarily 
posit that the passivized stocks are inefficiently priced all the time, but rather that the way in 
which they approach efficiency is affected by the added passivity and its non-fundamental 
flows.  
The first hypothesis of this thesis is related to the studies by Qin and Singal (2015) and Coles 
et al. (2018), and their finding about the diminished randomness of stock returns as a result of 
passivity. It further links to the papers by Baltussen et al. (2017) who hypothesized that the 
change in autocorrelation at the index-level is likely due to arbitrageurs correcting price impacts 
of index funds and Ben-David et al. (2017) who showed that ETFs as a product increases stock-
level tail risks.  
To build on these findings, I further study the shape of the realized returns distributions in the 
context of passive flows at the stock-level and hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Passivity increases the propensity of reversals for stocks. 
 
To test if passive money has the non-fundamental push and then leads to the reversal effects 
described above, the stocks with larger passive flows should exhibit smaller or negative 
skewness in their returns distribution and that the effects on skewness should come from more 
prominent left-tail movements, i.e. an elevated negative deviation. In Figure 3 I have plotted 
simulated distributions where the concept of skewness is easily understandable: the longer the 
tail is to a direction the more skewed it is towards that direction. Hence, stocks with higher 
tendency for reversals should graphically look closer to Figure C rather than A or B. Stock 
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returns can’t, however, be less than -100% which is why the left tail in the distributions is 
capped to that value.  
 
 
Figure 3: Simulated examples of distribution skewness 
 
On the other hand, it is likely that for some stocks the added buying pressure is likely justified, 
whereas for others not so much. For example, firms that consistently release good earnings and 
are profitable would more likely be bought by investors in any case whereas firms that do poorly 
wouldn’t probably have much of the buyers without the flows of passive institutions. These 
factors can be significant for the overall demand of a stock and I thus hypothesize that 
passivity’s effects are not constant across the board: 
A: Positive skewness
B: Zero skewness
C: Negative skewness
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Hypothesis 2: There are cross-sectional differences in the effects of passivity. 
 
H1 and H2 are conducted to test the potential short-term effects caused by the increase of 
passive ownership and whether they are associated with reversals or not. However, it may be 
that due to the rather constant flow of new passive money entering the markets, these potential 
short-term reversals can’t fully accommodate for the added buying pressure from passive 
vehicles. This may be the case if for example the selling pressure caused by active managers is 
always offset by new passive money entering index funds that are forced to buy even the stocks 
that are clearly mispriced in terms of their fundamentals. If the active managers recognize this 
ex-ante then they will avert entering a trade against highly indexed stocks which could further 
enhance the detachment effect. This is the previously mentioned limit to arbitrage, consistent 
with the hypothesized feedback loop, and it can be characterized as “noise trader risk by 
indexing”. Additionally, even if there are reversals found as a result of passive money flowing 
in and affecting the prices, it is very much possible that some premium still persists. For 
example, simply the fact that a stock may be a target of future non-fundamental flows can be a 
factor that affects a stock’s valuation. These premiums should, however, disappear quickly once 
a stock gets deleted from a prominent index because after a deletion it is no longer a target of 
future passive money. I thus hypothesize that: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Passivity leads to strengthening of the index-deletion effects. 
 
Index-deletion and addition -effects have been studied extensively before and the finding that 
stock deletions lead to high negative abnormal returns is shown in multiple papers (for example 
Petäjistö, 2011). But to my knowledge the potential drivers behind these effects have not been 
studied very thoroughly and the previous research tends to assume that every index-deletion is 
comparable. However, if we know that passive non-fundamental flows can affect the pricing 
process of stocks, then it is intuitive to look at the deletions in the context of passive ownership: 
stocks that have more passive ownership have had more passive flows and hence potentially a 
higher premium. The findings for this hypothesis would be consistent with Figure 2, i.e. a 
potential low frequency positive feedback loop driving the valuations of indexed stocks and 
due to persistent limits on arbitrage, active investors can’t reverse the effect completely until 
the stock gets deleted from a notable index. Hence, a more proper characterization of the index-
premium could perhaps be “the passivity premium”.  
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IV – Methodology and data 
 
Methods for H1: Realized shape 
 
Skewness 
 
To test the first hypothesis, I form returns distributions over time from daily returns and analyse 
the skewness of the distributions. I calculate the distributions from each stock’s idiosyncratic 
returns, i.e. firm-specific returns and these are obtained by simply subtracting the return of the 
market18 from the return of passive stock i at time t (Equation 1).  
Firm-specific returns are used instead of pure returns because there is already strong evidence 
that stocks move differently once they are included in indices and have passive ownership. 
Thus, to purify this effect to at least some extent, broad market returns are removed from their 
returns to approximate firm-specific returns. Additionally, if there are indeed higher reversals 
for stocks that have had non-fundamental pressure, and that the reversals are more likely to 
occur when firms release new information that doesn’t support the added pressure, then I would 
expect to see the effects more prominently in the firm-specific component of stock returns. The 
return calculation used in all calculations is the simple relative return.  
 
Idiosyncratic returns of stock i at time t are calculated by: 
𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝑅𝑗𝑡 (1) 
 
There are also other ways in which one can estimate firm-specific returns, such as running 
stock-specific Fama-French, CAPM or other factor -regressions and using the residuals of these 
regressions as the firm-specific return. However, the way in which the returns are calculated is 
not a significant factor when calculating the measures of shape for a stock’s returns distribution, 
for these measures mainly give weight to the most extreme movements of a stock. The most 
                                                          
18 It is assumed that the return of the Russell 3000 -index is the market return. This should be an accurate market 
proxy for the index covers approximately 98% of the U.S. equity market.  
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extreme movements of stocks are mostly due to idiosyncratic movements19 and as these are 
automatically given much more weight in the measures of distribution shape, one does not need 
to overly stress the way in which firm-specific returns are calculated. Evidence for this finding 
is provided in the paper of Chen et al. (2001) whose skewness forecasting -results are stable 
across multiple returns specifications. 
If it truly is the case that passivized stocks have a higher propensity for left tail -movements, 
then we should see a link between smaller/negative skewness in their returns distributions and 
the ownership and flows by passive money. Skewness20 is measured by the variable IRS 
(idiosyncratic return skewness): 
𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 =
∑
(𝐼𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑅̅̅ ̅)
3
𝑁
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑠3
(2)
 
 
Where 𝐼𝑅̅̅ ̅ is the mean idiosyncratic return over period t and 𝑠 is the standard deviation of IR 
over the same period. The intuition behind the skewness formula is clear: each realization is 
demeaned, raised to the third power, summed and then standardized for comparability. It thus 
gives higher weights to extreme realizations and tells us about the tails of a distribution and 
which tail tends to dominate the other. A highly negatively skewed distribution simply states 
that the most extreme movements tend to be negative. 
I then run two types of regressions to test the effect of passive ownership and flows to realized 
skewness. First, in a standard OLS form such as below: 
 
𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  +  𝑐𝑍 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 (3) 
 
Where the dependent variable is the measure of the realized skewness for stock i during quarter 
t. I analyse quarterly changes due to the fact that a more frequent time-period wouldn’t be 
possible because data limitations and a more infrequent period would include multiple 
                                                          
19 For example, if a stock moves up 10% in a day, the finding is automatically given much more weight in the 
skewness formula, than a day on which the return was 1%. As the market or other factors rarely move up 10% in 
a day, the finding is likely mostly due to firm-specific movements. The same intuition applies for negative 
returns. 
20 This is the Fisher-Pearson measure for skewness.  
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observations of many of the key variables. Passivity represents the variables of interest, i.e. 
passive ownership and its change or lagged change and Z represents a group of control variables 
that also affect the shape of a stocks returns distribution. This initial regression setting is similar 
to that of Ben-David et al. (2017) who studied how ETFs as a product can affect stock-level 
skewness, but differs importantly in two aspects: 1. I study the combined effects of all passive 
non-fundamental flows and 2. I use the firm-specific component of stock returns as was 
discussed earlier. 
The variables of most interest are the quarterly passive ownership-variables. First, the 
ownership share of passive money for individual stocks (𝑃_𝑂𝑤𝑛 𝑖𝑡), calculated by simply 
dividing the aggregate shares owned by passive institutions with the total amount of shares 
outstanding. Second, related to this variable is the flow of passive money (∆𝑃_𝑂𝑤𝑛 𝑖𝑡), i.e. the 
change of passive ownership, as that is really the factor that would be driving the valuations in 
the short-term. For example, a stock may not have had any new flows of passive money recently 
but it may still rank very highly in the share of passive money owning it. Hypothetically, these 
kinds of stocks would be accurately priced for mostly active money would have traded them 
more recently. The third important variable is the lagged change in ownership 
(∆𝑃_𝑂𝑤𝑛_𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑖𝑡), i.e. the ownership change in the previous time-period, for it is sensible 
to think that the potential effects, especially the reversals would take some time to occur.   
To control for market-specific factors driving the shape, I control for the realized skewness and 
standard deviation at the market-level (Russell 3000). Firm-specific control variables of interest 
are: P/E ratio, P/B ratio, P/S ratio, stock volume, number of analysts following the firm and the 
quarterly earnings surprise of a firm. The first three should capture the “glamour effect”, i.e. 
stocks that have high future expectations impounded in their prices and they may thus be riskier. 
Volume is added as in some extreme market moments a stock’s liquidity can diminish and thus 
lead to higher tail movements. Number of analysts following a firm should decrease tail 
movements, assuming that the markets follow the analysts and their estimates are accurate. EPS 
surprise controls for the fact that quarterly earnings are probably the single most important 
driver of extreme stock-specific movements each quarter.  
Finally, I also control for the size of a firm, its lagged return, lagged stock volume, lagged 
standard deviation and lagged realized skewness because these are shown to predict skewness 
(Chen et al., 2001).  
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Interestingly, on average the skewness for individual stocks tends to be positive, whereas 
somewhat paradoxically, the skewness at the index level is usually negative. Stock-level 
positive skewness may be explained with the fact that stock prices tend to on average exhibit 
positive returns and on average have an equal probability of experiencing movements from 
either tail of their distribution with the notion that the left tail is capped at -100%, for stock 
prices can’t be negative (Figure 3). The negative skewness of indices can be explained with the 
fact that indices are sort of like portfolios and due to diversification benefits, the overall 
volatility as well as large tail movements are less likely. But for a portfolio, the tendency to 
experience large negative returns is more probable than large positive returns because 
correlations tend to increase in periods of market stress (Albuquerque, 2012). So, the stocks 
within a portfolio have a higher tendency to co-move downwards rather than upwards and hence 
at the index-level, skewness is usually negative.  
Even though the measures of returns skewness are so different at the index and stock -level, the 
index level skewness measure is nevertheless an important factor to control for, because it gives 
a good understanding about the market conditions during a period under analysis. Previous 
literature about forecasting and explaining skewness is very thin though, so it is possible that 
some meaningful variables are omitted from the analysis and this area offers meaningful topics 
for future research. 
 
The second regression setting21 with time and industry -specific factors is as follows: 
 
𝐼𝑅𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑍 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 (4) 
 
Where IRS, Passivity and Z variables are the same as before. The differences in this setting are 
Industry and Time -variables that indicate industry and time -specific dummy variables, 
respectively. The time dummies control for the fact that each quarter is different from one 
another. This dummy should proxy a broader market state -variable than the mere Russell 
measures used earlier and considers factors that can’t be controlled for explicitly. Industry 
dummies are used to control for the fact that the returns distributions of different types of firms 
                                                          
21 This regression setting is more formally referred to as the “fixed-effects model” 
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are likely similar within groups and less so between groups. Ideally one would set a dummy for 
each different stock because each stock likely has some individual characteristics that drive 
their distributions, but due to the large amount of individual stocks in sample, it is not feasible 
in this study. 
 
Negative deviation 
 
Even if the results from the initial regressions would indicate that the effects of passivity on 
realized skewness are negative, it still doesn’t fully answer the question of where the results 
come from and are there steep negative reversals involved with passive purchases. In other 
words, the result of decreased skewness can still imply that the skewness of a stock is positive 
albeit it is less positive than before. Negative effect on skewness would be consistent with 
Hypothesis 1, but it is also consistent with a scenario where stocks that have had large passive 
inflows have less large positive movements (i.e. smaller positive skewness) and they may or 
may not have a higher tendency to have larger reversals. Smaller positive skewness would 
actually be in line with previous research about the fact that heavily indexed stocks tend to co-
move more together and exhibit smaller tail movements overall.  
Therefore, to give a more comprehensive answer the question of potential reversals, I run a 
third regression where the distinction to the regressions before is that the dependent variable is 
now the idiosyncratic negative standard deviation (“downside deviation”) of a stock: 
 
𝑁𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑍 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 + 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (5) 
 
Where 𝑁𝐷𝑒𝑣 is calculated as: 
𝑁𝐷𝑒𝑣 = √
∑ [min(𝐼𝑅𝑡, 0)]2
𝑁
𝑖=1
𝑁
(6) 
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The formula only considers the negative firm-specific returns and thus tells a more accurate 
story about the left-tail of a distribution, and a higher 𝑁𝐷𝑒𝑣 implies that there are days on which 
the stock’s return has been highly negative compared to normal negativity. Combined findings 
of passivity’s negative effect on skewness and positive effect on negative deviation would 
strongly imply that the observed effects are due to larger reversals and not simply smaller tail 
movements overall.  
 
Methods for H2: Cross-sectional differences of H1 
 
The characteristic of special interest is the profitability of a company. The intuition here is that 
profitability is probably the most salient factor for a company and the ROE measure is the most 
widely used measure of a company’s financial performance (Monteiro, 2006).  
Furthermore, stocks with lower profitability wouldn’t necessarily be bought by passive 
investors if they analysed the fundamentals of each investment they made, and hence the effects 
of passivity may differ according to the financial performance of firms. For example, if an 
active investor had to choose between two identical companies with differing profitability-
metrics, the one with the better profitability would likely be the winner. In the case of passive 
investing, this analysis is omitted from the investment process, and the investor likely ends up 
owning both of the companies. In this scenario the decision to invest passively results in flows 
to both of the companies, whereas if the investor invested actively, only the better company of 
the two would have received the flows.  
For the tests, I sort the sample stocks with the most recent ROE-measure at each quarter and 
run regressions 4 and 5 for these groups individually. ROE is calculated from the latest values 
released by dividing the trailing yearly net income by the total equity reported by the company. 
ROE is chosen as the main variable for these tests because it is calculated from the net income 
of a company which tends to be a key variable mostly observed by all market participants, it 
doesn’t directly relate to the size of a company for it is standardized by the amount of equity 
capital and the variable is very easy to calculate and understand. 
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Methods for H3: Passivity on the index-deletion effects 
 
To analyse the deletion effects, I employ a standard event-study methodology. I first calculate 
daily abnormal returns around the event periods similarly to Equation 1, where the abnormal 
return is the simple excess return over the Russell 3000 -index that represents the U.S. market 
return. 
I then calculate the cumulative abnormal returns from the individual abnormal returns of each 
event for each day in the event window by: 
                                      𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2) =  ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
 (7) 
 
The cumulative abnormal returns across dates in the event window are then averaged to find 
the average cumulative abnormal returns at each time point: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2) =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝑡1, 𝑡2)
𝑡2
𝑡=𝑡1
(8) 
 
Where 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 indicate the start and end dates of the event window, respectively. 
The statistical significance of the CARs/CAARs can simply be tested with the test statistic 
calculated by dividing the CAR/CAAR with its respective standard deviation. 
Finally, the cumulative abnormal returns are further analysed through a simple regressions 
model similar to Equations 3 and 4, where CAR can be any chosen period around the tested 
event: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 = 𝑎 + 𝑏𝑃𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦_𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑𝑖  +  𝑐𝑍 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡 (9) 
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Data 
 
Identifying passive funds and their holdings 
 
I identified passive mutual funds and ETFs using a combination of databases and 
methodologies. Initially, I searched equity index funds from The Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) by selecting funds that had been flagged as being a domestic equity 
index fund or an ETF during my sample period of 2000 – 2017. However, using CRSP as the 
sole identification tool would have been problematic as CRSP doesn’t make a clear distinction 
between different share classes of a fund. This problem is not apparent with Thomson 
Financial’s CDA/Spectrum S12 -dataset (CDA), where each fund number truly indicates a 
unique fund. Thus, to solve for potential duplicates, I bridged the two databases using Mutual 
Fund Links (MFLINKS)22. I then searched by name from CRSP and CDA for remaining equity 
index funds that had not been flagged as being index funds or ETFs in the CRSP database, using 
methodology similar to that of Qin and Singal (2015).  
Closet indexers were identified by first finding all domestic equity funds from CRSP that did 
not have the index fund/ETF flag, couldn’t be specified as an index fund by name, had a high 
amount of individual stocks (>100) in holding, because tracking an index requires a large 
amount of individual stocks, had AUM of over $50m to limit the sample size and had an average 
turnover of less than 40% per year, because index funds do not typically alter the compositions 
much year-on-year. The potential closet indexer -dataset was then merged with active share23 
dataset calculated by Martijn Cremers24, where I was able to match 535 of 549 potential closet 
indexers using their MFLINKS identifiers. I then calculated the average active share from 
Cremers’ dataset and flagged my initial dataset’s funds as closet indexers if their average active 
share was less than 50% (as per. Petäjistö, 2009). Through my methodology I found 68 closet 
indexers between 2000 and 2017 which is a bit less than what has been estimated earlier. This 
is likely due to the multiple variables and stages that I used in the estimation.  
                                                          
22 The CDA-MFLINKS-CRSP-structure was available through the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) 
23 Active share (AS) = 
1
2
∑ |𝑤𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑,𝑖 − 𝑤𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑖|
𝑁
𝑖=1  , where w indicates the weight of the stock in index/fund i and 
N the total amount of stocks in the benchmark index. 
24 Cremers has calculated the yearly Active Share for numerous funds from 1990 – 2015. AS is calculated in the 
dataset by comparing holdings with multiple indices and the one with the smallest AS is chosen. This dataset is 
available at: https://activeshare.nd.edu/data/  
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I then re-used the dataset of Cremers to find all funds that had an average AS of less than 10% 
to find index funds that might not have been flagged by my earlier methods. These funds were 
also sanity checked by name. I also checked that the dataset didn’t include any equal-weighted 
funds for their trading patterns could cause reverse causality in the regressions because they 
trade on portfolio movements (i.e. rebalance) and not simply investor subscriptions and 
redemtions (flows). Finally, I combined the funds from all methods, deleted duplicates and 
funds that Qin and Singal (2015) had excluded after analysing the prospectuses of each fund in 
their sample. The final passive fund dataset has 711 individual funds throughout the sample 
period. By my estimates, the amount of passive funds and assets over the period are somewhat 
larger than what Qin and Singal (2015), which is likely due to slightly different methods in 
searching by name and the multi-staged closet indexer -calculation that I used, but the estimates 
are well aligned overall. The amount of funds and their assets per year is shown in Table 1. The 
exact CDA fund codes are shown in Appendix A. 
 
25 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on market passivity 
 
After identifying the funds, I searched for their holdings from the CDA database where 
quarterly holdings data for mutual funds and ETFs is available. I then aggregated the holdings 
for each quarter using each stock’s unique CUSIP-code and was able to calculate the aggregate 
ownership-% of each individual stock for each quarter-end by dividing the aggregated shares 
by CDAs shares out (SHROUT)-variable25. The amount of individual stocks in the sample is 
very high (N = 10 594) throughout the whole period. This is mainly due to the fact that some 
indices have thousands of stocks in them (most notably Russell 1000/2000 -indices). This is a 
good thing as it automatically brings a lot of variation to my sample and thus I do not need to 
                                                          
25 More specifically, SHROUT *10 000 
Year
U.S. Equity 
Market Cap 
(billions $)
No. of Passive 
Funds
AUM of Passive 
Funds (billions $)
Total Passive 
Ownership %
2000 15 623,59 259 417,82 2,67 %
2001 13 845,40 311 408,61 2,95 %
2002* 11 027,06 329 283,56 2,57 %
2003 14 577,76 326 453,47 3,11 %
2004 16 450,54 358 647,35 3,94 %
2005 17 371,12 368 681,02 3,92 %
2006 19 607,35 357 787,98 4,02 %
2007 20 195,66 536 898,41 4,45 %
2008 12 129,15 590 915,45 7,55 %
2009 15 804,52 571 1095,72 6,93 %
2010* 18 490,58 536 980,56 5,30 %
2011* 17 886,83 513 1408,16 7,87 %
2012* 20 352,70 487 1575,86 7,74 %
2013* 26 281,33 470 2045,39 7,78 %
2014 28 964,03 463 2162,84 7,47 %
2015 27 658,78 444 2467,89 8,92 %
2016 30 150,55 436 2704,43 8,97 %
2017** 35 731,08 400 3359,60 9,40 %
* Estimated from reported holdings due to missing assets-data
** Estimated from CRSP holdings due to missing asset data. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on market passivity
Year-end assets under management for passive and active funds targeting the U.S. equity market. Passive fund 
AUM is aggregated from CDA's assets-variable. For years 2002, 2010-2013 the AUM is estimated from the 
reported holdings of the funds. For 2017 the AUM is calculated from the reported holdings in the CRSP database. 
For a more detailed discussion about the fund identification process, see Appendix A. U.S. Equity market cap is the 
total market cap -variable from CRSP. 
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gather and identify a separate sample with low passive ownership -characteristics from another 
source. The CDA dataset for holdings was incomplete for some funds and quarters however as 
CDA doesn’t list the smallest holdings26 and my sample likely lacks some passive funds 
completely, at least non-US-based passive funds that have not been matched in the CDA-
MFLINKS-CRSP-structure. It is thus likely that any estimates for passivity from my dataset 
have a downward bias. 
The quarterly change in passive ownership (ΔP_Own) was calculated by simply subtracting the 
next quarter’s observation’s aggregated ownership-% by the previous one. Thus, the variable 
describes the % of a firm’s total shares that have been bought/sold by passive funds during the 
quarter. For some stocks there were gaps in the ownership data and these were fixed by setting 
the next change observation as NA if the gap in holdings was more than three quarters. 
Otherwise this would have led to unwanted variation in the ΔP_Own-variable. However, if the 
gap was more than 2-years, it was assumed that that this was due to a stock’s re-addition to an 
index and the change in ownership was set as the aggregate ownership of the first aggregated 
holdings observation after the long period. Clear outliers (if absolute change > 4%) were set as 
NA in the change variable, as these were most likely data points as a result of missing holdings 
data and would again lead to unwanted variation. These extremely large changes would be 
sensible only in cases where a stock was added/deleted from an index and some of these cases 
are thus lost from the sample.  
Finally, instances where the change in holdings went from a large negative change in one 
quarter ( < -1%) to a large positive one in the subsequent one ( > + 1%) were likely a result of 
missing data in the negative change -quarter, and these changes were modified so that their 
values were multiplied by a factor of 0.25 so that the possible variation caused by missing data 
was minimized. These were not outright set as NAs because some of these swinging changes -
instances have really been true. For example, in volatile market states the fund flows to mutual 
funds and ETFs may experience large swings from quarter to quarter. ΔP_Own_Lagged was 
then calculated by moving the ΔP_Own observations forward by one period and set as 0 in case 
the observation was the first for a stock. Appendix B includes the distribution graphs of the 
ΔP_Own variable and other main variables that were adjusted. 
                                                          
26 These are typically cases where the fund has less than 10 000 shares of a company or less than 200 000$ 
invested. 
 
27 
 
Quarterly P/E, P/B, P/S, ROE and industry codes27 were calculated and found from 
COMPUSTAT, by matching the CUSIP-codes28 of each stock in sample. In the valuation 
measures, P was calculated from the product of common shares outstanding and the closing 
price of a stock in a quarter. E and S represent the trailing 12 months net income and revenue, 
respectively, of a company at the end of the quarter. B represents the book value of equity of a 
company at quarter-end.  
Number of analysts was gathered from Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S -database, by flagging a 
company with an analyst if he/she had issued a yearly earnings per share -target for a firm. 
Quarterly earnings surprise was also calculated from I/B/E/S-dataset, by averaging the analysts’ 
quarterly EPS targets and then subtracting the actual value released by the company. These 
were then standardized by dividing with the absolute value of the average expectation.  
Daily price data for Russell 3000 -index was directly available from Yahoo Finance, which was 
used to calculate quarterly skewness and standard deviation -metrics for the index. Price data 
for individual stocks was gathered from CRSP by CUSIP-codes.  
Before running the tests for H1 and H2, I purified all the other relevant variables from clear 
outliers and irrelevant observations: EPS surprise was set between -500% and +500% for 
anything above these wouldn’t be very sensible, market cap was set above 50m because some 
stocks in the sector funds were extremely small and likely exhibit unwanted characteristics, 
negative deviation and IRS were capped at 20% and |5|, respectively, because a few 
observations were clearly out of line due to missing price data (Appendix B), PB was set below 
100, PE between 0 and 1000, PS below 1000 and ROE between -200% and +200%.  
The intuition behind setting limits to variables is that many of the variables would otherwise 
have observations that are in no way sensible and thus would affect the results in unwanted 
ways. Finally, I deleted quarterly observations for stock’s that had had a stock split for these 
observations would be largely biased29. Additionally, it has been shown (Grinblatt et al., 1984) 
that stock splits tend to affect the returns of the stocks which is why I decided to exercise caution 
                                                          
27 The specific industry codes used as dummies in the regressions are GICS Industry Groups (GGROUP) -codes. 
This was chosen for its high mapping-% with my dataset and large variability as GGROUP has 26 unique 
identifiers. 
28 COMPUSTAT actually uses the 9-digit CUSIP-code for stocks, so the codes from CDA/CRSP-structure had 
to be modified first. 
29 Split quarters were identified from CRSP using the CFACPR-variable which is a factor used to adjust the raw 
prices. A change in the factor within a quarter implies that there has been a split. 
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and remove these data points. The descriptive statistics for all the variables and their remaining 
observations is shown in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N Min Max Average Median Stdev
P_Own (%) 284 402 0.00 31.11 3.38 1.18 4.31
ΔP_Own (%) 223 734 -3.99 3.99 0.16 0.03 0.93
IR (%) 19 349 554 -97 500 0.07 -0.04 15.00
IRS 281 708 -4.99 4.99 0.23 0.19 1.18
Negative deviation (%) 284 402 0.00 19.98 1.95 1.50 1.52
Stdev 284 402 0.03 4020 3.26 2.30 11.73
Mcap (m$) 239 880 50 859 968 5788 734 22 394
P/E 194 261 0.00 1000 60.00 31.90 92.53
P/B 263 614 0.00 100 3.13 1.88 5.11
P/S 239 237 0.00 1000 9.80 2.46 45.50
Volume (m) 284 402 0.13 825 293 1024 189 5314
Analysts 224 568 1 56 7 5 6.70
EPS Surprise (%) 184 730 -500 500 4 4 72
Russell Skewness 284 402 -1.50 0.82 -0.11 -0.05 0.46
Russell Stdev 284 402 0.36 4.30 1.08 0.89 0.61
Quarters 72
Industries 26
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the variables
Below are shown the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in the regressions. The data points have been combined from 
COMPUSTAT, CRSP, CDA, I/B/E/S, Yahoo Finance and from the AS dataset of Martijn Cremers. Some of the variables have been 
capped as per the discussion in the data-section.
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Identifying index deletions 
 
Historical index compositions were gathered from COMPUSTAT and the following indices 
were chosen as target indices due to their prominence, firm-type variability and size: S&P 500 
index, S&P 500 Growth index, S&P 500 Value index, S&P 400 Mid-Cap index, S&P 600 
Small-Cap index, S&P 100 index and NASDAQ 100 index.  
Russell 1000/2000 indices were not included in the sample for it is a well-known fact that once 
a stock is deleted from Russell 1000 it gets automatically added to Russell 2000 where its 
weight is a lot bigger than in Russell 100030. Thus, for those cases the deletion effects would 
be biased. The file extracted from COMPUSTAT includes all the historical firms in the indices 
by CUSIP and it lists the dates on which a stock has been added or deleted from an index.  
With these indices and their compositions, I identified 5050 deletions out of which 4383 
instances were unique date/deletion-observations during the sample period of 2000 – 2017. The 
stock prices and returns were then again gathered for all of the event stocks from CRSP by the 
CUSIP-code of each firm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30 This is actually a convenient way to have exogenous variation in passive ownership as is shown in the paper 
by Chang et al. (2015). 
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V – Results 
 
 
Realized idiosyncratic skewness 
 
The results for passive ownership’s effect on realized idiosyncratic skewness running Equations 
3 and 4 are shown in Table 3 with the robust t-scores (White standard errors)31 in parenthesis 
under each coefficient. There are three different models tested for each regression type in Table 
3. These initial regressions suggest that the level of passive ownership has a statistically 
significant negative effect on realized skewness and that the changes and lagged changes in 
passive ownership further contribute to the negative effect on realized skewness once we 
control for a group of other variables, namely the time and industry -specific factors (Model 6). 
Due to the slight risk of multicollinearity in the regressions 1-2 and 4-5, indicated by the 
correlations (Appendix B) among the variables, I drop a group of variables in regressions 3 and 
6 and consider the results of these regressions as the most precise estimates for the effects. 
Thus, by my estimates (Models 3 and 6), on average the level of passive ownership decreases 
the quarterly realized idiosyncratic skewness by about 0.04 for each 10% out of total shares out 
owned by passive institutions, and that the realized skewness is further decreased by 0.01 – 
0.02 for each 1% of shares outstanding purchased by the institutions in the same quarter and by 
a further 0.01 – 0.02 in the subsequent one. As the mean realized quarterly skewness32 in my 
sample was approximately 0.23, the initial results indicate that passive ownership and the flows 
can in some cases push the realized skewness to the negative. The results also hold if the co-
effect of the variables is not considered, as is shown in the Robustness-section of this paper 
(Table 10).  
Somewhat surprisingly, the firm-specific factors proxying for the glamour effect do not seem 
to have a large impact on the realized skewness, though they are consistently significant in 
statistical sense. Out of the three valuation measures, the P/B ratio seems to be the most 
important driver of realized skewness where an increase of 1 in the ratio increases the realized 
skewness by around 0.005 – 0.01. The market-level skewness and standard deviation -measures 
are consistently significant in explaining the stock-level realized skewness but their effect 
                                                          
31 I.e. by using heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors, courtesy of: 
https://economictheoryblog.com/2016/08/07/robust-standard-errors-in-r-function/ 
32 The mean skewness is in line with previous studies such as Albuquerque (2012) who found the stock-level 
mean skewness to be around 0.25 – 0.30 during a similar time-period. 
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mostly disappears in models 4-6, implying that controlling for time captures the market-level 
effects quite well. The number of analysts and EPS surprise -variables are highly significant, 
and the EPS surprise -variable is a very prominent variable in explaining quarterly realized 
skewness in terms of size and statistical significance, where a 10%-point positive surprise 
implies a 0.02 increase in realized skewness. This finding is rather important for future studies 
around realized skewness, for as was mentioned earlier, there hasn’t been much research around 
the topic and the EPS surprise variable has not been previously used in any context.  
The coefficient for firm size (natural logarithm of market cap in millions), lagged skewness, 
lagged standard deviation and lagged returns are well in line with the findings of Chen et al. 
(2001) in terms of both significance and magnitude, implying that these factors are still very 
important nearly two decades later. Notably the R-squared values of the models ( ~ 2 - 4%) are 
similar to the models in their paper as well as the paper by Ben-David et al. (2017), affirming 
that R-squared values of this magnitude are typical when modelling realized stock-level 
skewness. Still, it of course raises a question about the goodness-of-fit for the models which is 
why I further plot the residuals of the main models in Appendix C. As there shouldn’t be major 
violations of the OLS-assumptions, the coefficients shown in Table 3 are good approximations 
about the mean effects, regardless of the low R-squared values.  
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.28 0.53 0.30 0.34 0.37 0.19
(83.71) (12.21) (20.10) (15.49) (5.18) (6.57)
P_Own -0.012 -0.001 -0.004 -0.015 0.005 -0.004
(-17.33) (-0.60) (-3.78) (-15.25) (1.51) (-3.48)
ΔP_Own -0.01 -0.01 -0.013 -0.022 -0.014 -0.022
(-1.89) (-2.04) (-3.38) (-5.83) (-1.82) (-4.53)
ΔP_Own_Lagged -0.01 0.001 -0.010 -0.018 -0.004 -0.019
(-1.59) (0.64) (-2.39) (-4.98) (-0.66) (-3.89)
Russ_Skewness -0.11 -0.10 0.04 -0.05
(-10.53) (-11.19) (1.01) (-0.90)
Russ_Stdev -0.04 0.009
(-5.54) (0.23)
P/E 0.0002 0.0001
(4.53) (2.70)
P/B 0.005 0.01 0.004 0.006
(4.53) (12.08) (4.54) (9.75)
P/S 0.002 0.002
(4.74) (4.46)
ln(Market cap (m)) 0.06 -0.03 0.09 -0.022
(12.40) (-13.10) (18.00) (-10.60)
ln(Volume (t)) -0.07 -0.10
(-15.30) (-19.26)
Return_Lagged -0.003 -0.003
(-15.03) (-15.90)
Skewness_Lagged 0.014 -0.002 0.012 -0.006
(4.19) (-0.70) (3.42) (-2.30)
Stdev_Lagged 0.04 0.01 0.052 0.008
(17.31) (10.04) (18.39) (8.79)
Analysts -0.002 -0.004
(-2.35) (-4.40)
EPS Surprise 0.29 0.18 0.29 0.18
(37.30) (35.90) (36.93) (35.79)
Number of time dummies** 71 71 71
Number of sector dummies** 25 25 25
N 204 828 80 882 118 836 204 828 80 882 118 836
Adj. R
2 0.18% 2.6% 1.5% 0.13% 3.7% 2.2%
** Most sector and time dummies are highly significant in all models. 
Table 3: Passive ownership and flows on the skewness of a stock's idiosyncratic returns distribution
The regressions are run for the whole time period of 2000 - 2017 which consists of a total of 284 402 individual firm-quarter findings. Realized skewness is the 
Fisher-Pearson skewness during each quarter calculated from idiosyncratic returns. P_Own indicates the quarterly ownership-% of all passive funds out of total 
shares out for each company. ΔP_Own indicates the quarterly percentage point change in the ownership of passive funds for each stock in the sample. 
ΔP_Own_Lagged is the change during the previous quarter.  Russ_Skewness and Stdev indicate the realized returns distribution descriptors for the Russell 3000 -
index during each quarter. P/E, P/B and P/S variables indicate firm-specific valuation metrics, calculated each quarter by dividing a firm's market cap with its 
realized 1-year net result/book value of equity/revenue.  Return is the stock's return in the previous quarter. Market cap is the quarter end market cap of a stock 
measured in millions. Volume is the amount of sells of a stock in a quarter, measured in thousands. Analysts are measured as the number of analysts giving yearly 
EPS estimates for a firm. EPS surprise is the relative surprise of the EPS released in the quarter being analyzed. Lagged variables are calculated from the 
observations of the previous quarter. Time and sector dummies indicate the amount of dummy variables in the model.  The number of observations is not stable in 
each model for there is lacking data for some variables, most notably the valuation metrics. The t-scores are calculated using robust standard errors and they are 
represented in brakets below the coefficients.
Standard OLS regression (eq 5) Fixed-effects models (eq 6)Dependent variable: Realized 
Quarterly Idiosyncratic Skewness
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Realized idiosyncratic negative deviation 
 
Hypothesis 1 is further supported by the regressions results in Table 4, where I explain realized 
negative idiosyncratic deviation, i.e. the negative deviation of the firm-specific returns, with 
the passivity variables and a group of control variables (Equation 7). I found that both the 
change and the lagged change in passive ownership have a consistent positive effect on the 
idiosyncratic negative deviation, where a 1%-point quarterly increase in passive ownership 
leads to an increase of 0.01 – 0.04%-points in realized negative deviation in the same quarter 
and an additional 0.01 – 0.04%-points in the subsequent quarter (Models 3 to 5). The statistical 
significance for the same quarter -effects varies from model to model and does not reach a high 
significance in all instances whereas the lagged change is highly significant across the models. 
The result is intuitive as I would expect that it takes some time to correct the effects of passivity. 
Interestingly though, the level of passive ownership has an extremely significant negative effect 
on realized negative deviation (1%-points increase in level predicts a 0.03%-point decrease in 
negative deviation), implying that stocks that have the highest level of ownership by passive 
money tend to have less prominent left tail in the returns distribution. This result is actually 
intuitive and in line with prior findings where it has been shown that the most heavily indexed 
stocks co-move more together and behave more like the index itself, thus having less extreme 
negative or positive idiosyncratic movements overall.  
The result that passive ownership has a negative coefficient for both realized skewness and 
negative deviation do not contradict each other, for it simply means that the level of passive 
ownership tends to lead to less prominent tail movements overall. Similarly, the results for the 
flows, where the coefficients were the opposite, implies that the flows lead to higher negative 
movements, i.e. negative skewness due to more prominent left-tail movements, hence 
supportive of H1.  
The effects of passive flows and level of ownership are a lot smaller than many of the other 
variables such as index-level movements, EPS surprise or lagged stock-specific movements. 
Also, the results for the control variables are intuitive, i.e. smaller negative deviation predicted 
by size and EPS surprise, and larger by lagged risk measures (standard deviation and skewness). 
Regardless of the magnitude of the passivity variables, the fact that the flows consistently 
predict an elevated negative deviation is an important finding regarding the changes to the 
pricing process caused by passive institutions in the short-term and it ultimately implies that 
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active investors are correcting the potential mispricing caused by passive flows, at least to some 
extent.  
The dependent variable in the regressions 1-5 is the negative deviation calculated from firm-
specific returns. This may pose a problem in the sense that during a quarter the amount of 
negative IR days for individual stocks may be quite low. Therefore, in Model 6, I switch the 
dependent variable to negative deviation calculated from the total returns, i.e. returns from 
which the market return has not been detracted from. The results from this regression are mostly 
in line with the results in Models 1-5, but there is a significant change in the coefficient for 
same quarter change in passive ownership.  
More specifically, in Model 6, a 1%-point increase in passivity predicts a 0.017%-point 
decrease in realized negative deviation. This may be due to the tendency for stocks to trend 
upwards and the fact that passive flows have been mostly positive during the sample period, 
although market and time -specific factors have been controlled for. The result is also consistent 
with the notion that passive flows can have positive effects on stock returns initially which can 
lead to decreased left-tail moves in terms of total returns, and that corrections take time (positive 
lagged coefficient).  
Perhaps the most controversial interpretation of these results can be derived from the fact that 
same quarter flows predict smaller negative deviation from non-adjusted returns but larger 
negative deviation for the firm-specific component of returns. Therefore, one could conclude 
that the market component of returns is slower in correcting the effects caused by passive flows. 
The result implies that the effects of passivity may not have as meaningful effects on the relative 
valuations among companies (firm-specific returns adjust more quickly), but more on the 
aggregate stock market valuation. This would also be consistent with the fact that there are now 
more indices than stocks, i.e. most stocks are indexed, and that passivity takes no view on 
corporate valuations, so the effects of passivity could perhaps be more severe at the market 
level, instead of at the company-level. Nevertheless, the more likely driver behind the results is 
the fact that stocks tend to trend upwards and the passive flows have coincided with this, but it 
is an interesting finding in any case.  
Ultimately these results give some explanation for the disappearance of stock return 
randomness found in the papers by Qin and Singal (2015) and Coles et al. (2018) and it is 
consistent with the findings of Baltussen et al. (2017) regarding the index-level negativity in 
autocorrelation in recent years. 
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Table 4: Passive ownership and flows on the idiosyncratic negative deviation of a stock's returns distribution 
 
Pure returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 2.16 0.39 0.32 0.33 1.26 0.75
(460) (14.71) (12.85) (14.95) (35.04) (18.26)
P_Own -0.07 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(-88.01) (-43.98) (-23.73) (-29.15) (-30.05) (-27.38)
ΔP_Own 0.051 0.044 0.025 0.042 0.007 -0.017
(0.91) (3.75) (1.53) (3.41) (0.92) (-5.18)
ΔP_Own_Lagged 0.028 0.024 0.025 0.035 0.013 0.014
(1.30) (4.59) (5.87) (10.33) (4.17) (4.95)
Russ_Skewness 0.14 0.13 0.33 0.26 0.32
(24.81) (19.24) (34.72) (36.73) (44.60)
Russ_Stdev 0.44 0.37
(76.62) (46.22)
P/E 0.0003 0.0002
(6.43) (4.52)
P/B 0.010 0.009 0.013 0.003 -0.00
(11.65) (8.17) (8.06) (1.30) (-0.76)
P/S 0.005 0.003
(4.13) (3.32)
ln(Market cap (m)) -0.41 -0.34 -0.41 -0.40 -0.49
(-124) (-35.62) (-38.48) (-56.89) (-49.46)
ln(Volume (t)) 0.29 0.24
(83.00) (30.21)
Return_Lagged -0.002
(-2.65)
Skewness_Lagged 0.031 0.017 0.011 0.016
(6.79) (6.96) (8.77) (8.07)
Stdev_Lagged 0.11 0.030 0.034 0.024
(5.76) (1.82) (1.74) (1.75)
Analysts 0.002 0.001
(1.12) (1.05)
EPS Surprise -0.06 -0.061 -0.10 -0.10 -0.09
(-11.80) (-12.67) (-23.17) (-23.02) (-20.80)
Number of time dummies** 71 71
Number of sector dummies** 25 25
N 207 828 82 927 81 882 119 836 119 836 119 836
Adj. R
2 3.8% 39.1% 42.8% 23.2% 43.6% 48.4%
** Most sector and time dummies are highly significant
Table 4: Passive ownership and flows on the idiosyncratic negative deviation of a stock's returns distribution
The regressions are run for the whole time period of 2000 - 2017 which consists of a total of 284 402 individual firm-quarter findings. The dependent variable 
is the realized negative deviation, calculated from idiosyncratic returns. P_Own indicates the quarterly ownership-% of all passive funds out of total shares out 
for each company. ΔP_Own indicates the quarterly percentage point change in the ownership of passive funds for each stock in the sample. ΔP_Own_Lagged 
is the change during the previous quarter.  Russ_Skewness and Stdev indicate the realized returns distribution descriptors for the Russell 3000 -index during 
each quarter. P/E, P/B and P/S variables indicate firm-specific valuation metrics, calculated each quarter by dividing a firm's market cap with its realized 1-year 
net result/book value of equity/revenue.  Return is the stock's return in the previous quarter. Market cap is the quarter end market cap of a stock measured in 
millions. Volume is the amount of sells of a stock in a quarter, measured in thousands. Analysts are measured as the number of analysts giving yearly EPS 
estimates for a firm. EPS surprise is the relative surprise of the EPS released in the quarter being analyzed. Lagged variables are calculated from the 
observations of the previous quarter. Time and sector dummies indicate the amount of dummy variables in the model.  The number of observations is not stable 
in each model for there is lacking data for some variables, most notably the valuation metrics. The t-scores are calculated using robust standard errors.
Dependent variable: Realized Quarterly Idiosyncratic 
Negative Deviation
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Cross-sectional differences of realized skewness and negative deviation 
 
Realized skewness regression results from grouping the sample in to five groups based on their 
most recent released ROE-value, which is used as a proxy for the overall economic 
fundamentals of a company, are shown in Table 5, where Group 1 indicates the group with the 
worst fundamentals and Group 5 the one with the best fundamentals.  
Passivity’s effect on realized skewness for different groups seems to vary a bit, namely that the 
effects are most prominent for the group of stocks with the lowest profitability both in terms of 
the level and flows of passivity. Comparing the two extremes, the level coefficient has a 10 
times more negative effect on realized skewness for the group with the worst fundamentals (-
0.02 vs -0.002). The flow variables are notably different as well, with -0.05 vs -0.02 in the same 
quarter and -0.06 vs +0.02 in the subsequent quarter, for worst ROE group and best ROE group, 
respectively. The effects of passivity are also notably more statistically significant (absolute t-
values > 4.00) for the group with the worst fundamentals compared to the other groups.  
These results are consistent with the notion that stocks that have worse fundamentals wouldn’t 
perhaps otherwise be in much demand and hence the effects caused by passive flows may be 
elevated, whereas the stocks with the best fundamentals would receive the buying pressure in 
any case and thus the reversal effects are less prominent. Or in other words, the share of non-
fundamental demand is perhaps higher for stocks that perform poorly economically and thus 
leads to larger effects on the downside once the effects are corrected.  
Therefore, the results from H2 not only reveal that cross-sectional differences are significant, 
but also support the notion that passive share matters because it is intuitive to think that the 
share of non-fundamental trading is higher for the economically worst companies. 
The control variables are mostly stable across groups and the coefficients are in line with the 
results of the total sample in Table 3.  
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Table 5: Passivity on realized skewness, grouped by ROE 
 
 
Worst ROE Best ROE
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
Intercept 0.54 -0.04 -0.13 -0.23 -0.04
(6.60) (-0.49) (-2.03) (-4.30) (-0.61)
P_Own -0.02 -0.01 0.002 0.004 -0.002
(-4.22) (-3.32) (0.87) (1.41) (-0.73)
ΔP_Own -0.05 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(-4.09) (-1.00) (-0.60) (-0.99) (-2.00)
ΔP_Own_Lagged -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.02
(-4.60) (-1.44) (-2.05) (-0.94) (1.89)
Russ_Skewness -0.13 0.15 -0.09 -0.12 0.18
(-0.89) (0.94) (-0.67) (-1.08) (1.60)
P/B 0.007 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.004
(5.53) (5.90) (6.54) (5.32) (3.30)
ln(Market cap (m)) -0.02 -0.01 0.002 -0.004 -0.01
(-3.53) (-0.97) (0.53) (-0.93) (-2.21)
Return_Lagged -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.003
(-8.50) (-8.52) (-8.15) (-8.70) (-7.75)
Skewness_Lagged 0.03 0.02 -0.002 0.01 0.009
(4.30) (2.70) (-0.30) (2.60) (1.70)
Stdev_Lagged 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.04
(7.40) (7.88) (7.45) (6.80) (6.70)
EPS Surprise 0.09 0.15 0.27 0.39 0.32
(10.00) (17.33) (20.60) (24.00) (18.76)
Number of time dummies** 71 71 71 71 71
Number of sector dummies** 25 25 25 25 25
N 18 403 20 531 25 925 27 857 26 885
Adj. R
2 2.9% 2.9% 3.2% 3.8% 2.8%
** Most sector and time dummies are highly significant
Table 5: Passivity on realized idiosyncratic skewness,  grouped by ROE
The regressions are run for five different groups over 2000 - 2017 based on the latest revealed return of equity -value (ROE) of the firm. The 
dependent variable is the realized skewness, calculated from idiosyncratic returns. P_Own indicates the quarterly ownership-% of all passive 
funds out of total shares out for each company. ΔP_Own indicates the quarterly percentage point change in the ownership of passive funds 
for each stock in the sample. ΔP_Own_Lagged is the change during the previous quarter.  Russ_Skewness and Stdev indicate the realized 
returns distribution descriptors for the Russell 3000 -index during each quarter. P/B variable indicates firm-specific valuation metric, 
calculated each quarter by dividing a firm's market cap with its realized book value of equity.  Return is the stock's return in the previous 
quarter. Market cap is the natural logarithm of the quarter end market cap of a stock measured in millions. EPS surprise is the relative 
surprise of the EPS released in the quarter being analyzed. Lagged variables are calculated from the observations of the previous quarter. 
Time and sector dummies indicate the amount of dummy variables in the model.  The number of observations is not stable in each model for 
there is lacking data for some variables, most notably the valuation metrics. The t-scores are calculated using robust standard errors.
Dependent variable: Realized Quarterly Idiosyncratic 
Skewness
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Similarly, as in the H1 tests, to study the results further and understand the nature of the effects 
on realized skewness, I separately run negative deviation -regressions for each group in Table 
6.  
The results give support to the discussion above, because the group with the worst fundamentals 
has the greatest coefficients for both the flow variables (0.015 vs 0.009 and 0.041 vs 0.022), 
implying that for these stocks the non-fundamental buying pressure leads to the most extreme 
left-tail movements.  
The level of passivity again has a consistently negative effect on realized negative deviation as 
was discussed in the H1 results earlier. However, the effect seems to be slightly more prominent 
for the stocks with the best fundamentals. The story here may be that “good” stocks behave 
more like their respective indices (have less extreme tail movements) than the “bad” stocks 
because they are more prominent in the indices and tend to have higher passive levels overall. 
The difference of the magnitude for the coefficient among the extremes is not very large though 
(-0.01 vs -0.03).  
Ultimately, these regressions highlight the importance of firm characteristics when their 
sensitivity to passive non-fundamental pressure is analysed. The ROE variable seems to be a 
rather meaningful variable in grouping stocks, but there are surely endless amounts of additional 
variables as well. For future research, one can further study these sorting variables. 
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Table 6: Passivity on negative deviation, grouped by ROE 
 
 
Worst ROE Best ROE
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
Intercept 4.99 2.82 2.83 2.77 2.69
(54.00) (18.07) (26.90) (22.61) (17.43)
P_Own -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
(-2.66) (-6.78) (-11.10) (-11.76) (-13.02)
ΔP_Own 0.015 -0.015 -0.016 -0.008 0.009
(1.34) (-2.49) (-2.91) (-1.38) (1.33)
ΔP_Own_Lagged 0.041 0.009 0.010 0.025 0.022
(4.34) (1.64) (2.05) (7.04) (5.12)
Russ_Skewness 0.32 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.25
(13.20) (11.42) (14.07) (12.94) (16.20)
P/B -0.006 -0.001 0.011 0.012 -0.002
(-5.50) (-0.20) (2.50) (3.20) (-3.51)
ln(Market cap(m)) -0.28 -0.14 -0.15 -0.15 -0.14
(-39.40) (-20.92) (-29.20) (-23.47) (-17.40)
Return_Lagged -0.003 -0.005 -0.005 -0.003 0.00
(-8.88) (-7.75) (-5.50) (-2.49) (0.24)
Skewness_Lagged 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
(5.63) (6.47) (5.84) (5.19) (7.01)
Stdev_Lagged 0.02 0.14 0.09 0.11 0.17
(3.04) (5.70) (4.62) (4.46) (6.09)
EPS Surprise -0.09 -0.06 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05
(-8.90) (-9.79) (-7.39) (-4.17) (-3.49)
Number of time dummies** 71 71 71 71 71
Number of sector dummies** 25 25 25 25 25
N 18 403 20 531 25 925 27 857 26 885
Adj. R
2 29.9% 40.6% 36.8% 35.4% 38.9%
** Most sector and time dummies are highly significant
Table 6: Passivity on realized negative deviation, grouped by ROE
The regressions are run for five different groups over 2000 - 2017 based on the latest revealed return of equity -value (ROE) of the firm. 
The dependent variable is the realized negative deviation, calculated from idiosyncratic returns. P_Own indicates the quarterly ownership-% 
of all passive funds out of total shares out for each company. ΔP_Own indicates the quarterly percentage point change in the ownership of 
passive funds for each stock in the sample. ΔP_Own_Lagged is the change during the previous quarter.  Russ_Skewness and Stdev indicate 
the realized returns distribution descriptors for the Russell 3000 -index during each quarter. P/B variable indicates firm-specific valuation 
metric, calculated each quarter by dividing a firm's market cap with its realized book value of equity.  Return is the stock's return in the 
previous quarter. Market cap is the natural logarithm of the quarter end market cap of a stock measured in millions. EPS surprise is the 
relative surprise of the EPS released in the quarter being analyzed. Lagged variables are calculated from the observations of the previous 
quarter. Time and sector dummies indicate the amount of dummy variables in the model.  The number of observations is not stable in each 
model for there is lacking data for some variables, most notably the valuation metrics. The t-scores are calculated using robust standard 
errors.
Dependent variable: Realized Quarterly Idiosyncratic 
Negative Deviation
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Index deletion event window formation 
 
Before testing the third hypothesis of the thesis, i.e. whether index-deletion effects are a 
function of the level of passive ownership, I first merged the passive ownership -dataset 
described earlier with the event study -dataset and deleted events for which I don’t have 
ownership data. A total of 1982 events were identified for these tests. For initial tests, I then 
formed 5 groups based on the level of passive ownership in the previous quarter to test whether 
the amount of passive ownership prior to an index deletion is associated with the abnormal 
returns of stocks around the deletion events, where Group 1 indicates the stocks with the least 
passive ownership. Summary statistics of the five groups are shown in Table 7 indicating that 
there are no significant differences in a few key variables. 
 
 
Table 7: Summary statistics for event study groups 
 
Mean Min Max Stdev Mean time
Market Cap
Least passive 1 20 047 18 438 702 35 676 08/2011
2 13 663 8 364 064 32 367 09/2004
3 15 263 13 439 013 43 458 07/2006
4 18 497 11 276 808 34 272 11/2010
Most passive 5 10 003 14 140 018 14 005 07/2015
P/B
1 4,82 0,08 245,70 13,38
2 4,19 0,08 141,50 9,19
3 4,53 0,04 359,08 18,66
4 4,61 0,02 491,00 26,41
5 3,97 0,06 172,80 9,40
Analysts
1 15,45 1 45 8,17
2 12,45 1 37 8,03
3 11,11 1 38 6,98
4 14,28 1 46 8,42
5 12,14 1 37 8,17
EPS Surprise
1 0,03 -3,32 4,90 0,39
2 -0,06 -6,49 1,83 0,79
3 -0,05 -5,37 1,96 0,65
4 0,02 -12,39 2,76 0,73
5 0,05 -5,89 7,62 0,71
ROE
1 -0,03 -34,33 14,32 2,50
2 0,01 -12,83 5,88 0,98
3 1,66 -13,79 16,91 34,71
4 1,14 -18,21 33,74 23,46
5 -0,03 -38,72 6,82 1,84
                 Passivity Groups
Table 7: Summary statistics for event study groups
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Additionally, the index deletion -events allowed me to further check if the passivity sample and 
its change has been constructed properly, for I know for a fact that index-deletions lead to 
decreased passive ownership, ceteris paribus.  
Therefore, in Figure 4 A I plot the mean change of passive ownership and in B the mean change 
standardized by the level of passive ownership from 4 quarters prior to the deletion quarter to 
4 quarters after the deletion quarter. These figures clearly indicate that the passive ownership -
variable behaves exactly as it should in the case of index deletions and therefore verifies the 
dataset overall, i.e. there is a significantly large decrease in the share owned by passive 
institutions in the quarter where the index deletion came in to effect. 
 
 
Figure 4 A: Change of passive ownership in index deletions 
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Figure 4 B: Change of passive ownership in index deletions 
 
The total event study -period under main analysis is from 50 days prior to the index deletion to 
50 after the deletion. The long period is chosen because I decided to form four distinct sub-
periods in the event studies and compare their mean abnormal returns: 1st from -50 to -35 days 
which indicates the period in which the event was not yet known, implying that any trading 
done here was only by the most active and highest risk-tolerating investors anticipating the 
announcement, 2nd period from -34 to -5 day proxies for the announcement period33, where also 
traders with lower risk preference and probably less sophistication are willing to trade the 
deletion, 3rd from -4 to +5 which is the period in which index funds are expected to make their 
adjustments and it proxies for the non-fundamental trading period and finally 4th from +6 to 
+50 which indicates the post-deletion period. The period -50 - +5 is also calculated for it ignores 
the post-deletion rebound that is apparent in the results.  
 
Index deletion event study results 
 
Table 8 panel A shows the results for the cumulative abnormal returns separated by period/level 
of passivity and the results are also plotted in Figure 5 with daily CAAR and its 95% confidence 
interval34. The effects caused by index deletion are clearly extremely large and tend to be 
negative. Importantly, the group with the least passive ownership is strikingly different 
                                                          
33 For example, the S&P500 reports index deletions 1-30 days prior to the actual effective date. 
34 The event studies were run using R package “Eventstudies” created by Ajay Shah, Chirag Anand, Vikram 
Bahure and Vimal Balasubramaniam. 
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compared to the other groups in all of the periods under analysis and the results suggest that for 
this group the event effects are actually slightly positive. This finding may be explained with 
the notion that if a stock has a very low level of passive ownership prior to a deletion, its weight 
in the index is likely also very small and any trading related to it being dropped may have 
already been conducted earlier. Whereas stocks that still have moderate to high amounts of 
passive ownership have more mixed views about their future in the index and thus the deletion 
is a surprise to at least some market participants.  
Importantly, the clear distinction of the results between groups 1 and 5 is rather strong evidence 
that the sample building process for the passive ownership -variables is successful and it brings 
robustness to the results of the earlier regressions. 
The most interesting finding in the deletions is the trend in the period -50 to -35 when the event 
windows are run by passivity group, which indicates that the more passive ownership prior to 
the deletion, the higher the negative abnormal returns are in the anticipation window. The 
anticipation window represents the period where the index deletion was still unknown to the 
markets which implies that higher abnormal negative returns in this period suggests that 
anticipators view these stocks as being less accurately priced and are willing to trade them more 
heavily. And if it is assumed that there are indeed investors that possess better skills in picking 
stocks and anticipating future index compositions, then I would expect these investors to be the 
ones trading before anyone else. If their views are indeed accurate, it would suggest that the 
level of passive ownership and new flows may be driving the valuations, not only the mere fact 
that a stock is in an index.  
These anticipation effects are discussed also in a related recent study by Arnott et al. (2018) 
where they show that for stocks in the S&P 500 since 1989, the one-month prior return over 
the market return has been +1.84% and -6.57% for additions and deletions, respectively. They 
discuss that the most plausible explanation is that there is substantial amount of smart money 
anticipating index composition changes and trading the stocks accordingly. The results for the 
deletion event studies in this thesis highly support this notion. 
Other than the observations of the first group and in the anticipation period, there doesn’t seem 
to be a clear trend where higher passivity would lead to larger effects in the other windows. 
From -50 to +50 the group with the most passive ownership has the largest negative CAAR and 
the only group with a consistently negative 95% confidence interval throughout the event 
window, but the results are not very consistent for the group with 2nd most passive ownership 
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is only slightly negative. It would actually seem that the effects in the windows from -50 to +6 
are the biggest for stocks with around the mean amount of passive ownership.  
Perhaps the effects of the deletion on stock prices from the announcement onwards have little 
to do with the potential effects that passive money has had and more with the mere fact that 
there is a deletion and speculators trade the stocks in a similar fashion regardless of the share 
owned by passive institutions, hence leading to larger than warranted price decreases that are 
then corrected to some extent, as seen by the apparent rebound in the CARs in Figure 5. 
Nevertheless, the finding that the least passive stocks deviate so much from the rest of the 
sample and that the anticipation effects have a clear trend with respect to passivity, indicate that 
there may be latent long-term premiums caused by passive money.  
Also, to my knowledge this type of event study by group and by window has not been studied 
in this context yet, and the result that there are clearly a lot of variation with respect to index 
deletions is an interesting finding and offers various research topics for the future. One could 
for example analyse the short interest for firms prior to the deletion announcement to see 
whether smart money is indeed trading the announcements and if it is linked to the amount of 
passive ownership. 
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Table 8: Abnormal returns around index deletions grouped by passivity and year 
Additionally, I grouped the individual events by year and ran similar event studies in Panel B. 
The yearly events were tested because the exact level of passive ownership may not be accurate 
in some cases due to missing data, as was discussed in the data section of the sample building.  
The yearly separation has a favourable property in the sense that I know for a fact that the mean 
passive ownership among all firms in year t+1 is higher than in t+0, as can be seen from Table 
1. The trade-off here is that there are likely time-specific factors driving the results during an 
Panel A: Grouped by passivity
-50 / -35 -34 / -5 -4 / +5 +6 / +50 -50 / +50 -50 / +5
Deletion date 
AR
Mean lagged 
P_Own
Least passive 1 0,20 0,46 0,34 1,42 2,75 1,23 0,02 0.12%
2 -0,72 -4,07 -1,83 5,60 -1,83 -7,46 -1,31 1.33%
3 -0,75 -4,31 -2,68 5,70 -2,07 -8,16 -1,46 4.00%
4 -1,14 -4,08 -0,23 5,21 -0,41 -5,66 -0,47 7.63%
Most passive 5 -1,63 -3,74 -0,99 4,45 -2,14 -6,48 -0,63 13.94%
Panel B: Grouped by year
-50 / -35 -34 / -5 -4 / +5 +6 / +50 -50 / +50 -50 / +5
Deletion date 
AR
2000 1,81 -6,37 -3,47 5,94 -1,53 -8,12 -2,83
2001 -1,17 -11,43 -3,54 2,71 -12,79 -17,34 -22,43
2002 -5,22 -7,57 -7,17 9,97 -11,80 -21,39 -20,64
2003 1,87 -2,37 1,05 6,96 7,16 0,02 -1,55
2004 -0,49 -3,39 0,85 3,59 -0,87 -4,12 -4,75
2005 -1,62 -2,38 -0,48 -1,09 -5,20 -4,37 -5,84
2006 -5,94 -6,32 -0,04 -1,76 -18,16 -15,11 -16,13
2007 1,22 1,35 1,48 -0,45 3,82 3,84 3,81
2008 -0,77 -12,03 -8,13 14,77 -7,43 -21,54 -21,30
2009 -2,39 -8,80 0,71 21,82 14,82 -7,42 -13,14
2010 -1,92 2,91 0,59 5,17 6,60 1,35 1,80
2011 1,08 -0,49 0,97 -5,89 -4,07 1,17 -1,13
2012 -3,38 -1,25 -0,33 6,13 -0,14 -6,85 -7,38
2013 -3,14 -3,20 0,73 -3,03 -8,77 -5,67 -7,19
2014 -2,72 -4,02 -0,29 0,93 -6,72 -8,02 -7,77
2015 -0,78 -5,97 -1,25 -6,89 -15,06 -8,69 -8,14
2016 -0,05 0,37 0,46 2,04 3,24 1,33 1,17
2017 -2,95 -5,79 0,25 -0,27 -9,72 -9,71 -11,39
Mean abnormal return per period
This table shows the results for the event studies run around index deletions for S&P 500 index, S&P 500 Growth index, S&P 500 
Value index, S&P 400 Mid-Cap index, S&P 600 Small-Cap index, S&P 100 index and NASDAQ 100 index from 2000 to 2017. 
Abnormal returns are calculated as the excess returns over the Russell 3000 -index. In Panel A, five studies are run by grouping 
1982 deletions by the level of passive ownership in the previous quarter. In Panel B, the events are grouped by the year in which 
the deletion became effective. For Panel A results, the significance intervals can be seen in Figure 2 where the values indicate the 
CAAR at each time point and its 95% confidence interval. Panel B significance results at the 95% level are indicated with *.
Table 8: Abnormal returns around index deletions grouped by passivity and year
Mean abnormal return per period
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event window, i.e. events during year t+1 can systematically be different from t+0 due to 
various other reasons than just the level of passive ownership. Similarly though, the anticipation 
window from -50 to -35 has been systematically negative and somewhat more consistent in the 
latter years which is further evidence that the level of passivity may be driving valuations that 
are then corrected by active investors once they anticipate an index deletion event in the near 
future. But overall, the results in Panel B do not indicate that there would be a clear pattern in 
the evolution of deletion effects over the years.  
 
 
Figure 5: Index-deletion CAAR windows by passive ownership groups 
 
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Event windows for index deletions with a total of 1982
deletions, grouped by passive ownership in the prior quarter 
where group 1 indicates the group with the least passive 
ownership and group 5 the one with the most passive 
ownership. T=0 indicates the effective date of the deletion. 
Values at each time point are the cumulative average 
abnormal returns (CAAR) of the sample up to that point. 
The returns are simple abnormal returns calculated as the 
excess return over the Russell 3000 -index. Dotted lines 
indicate the 95% confidence interval for each CAAR value.
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Regression results for abnormal returns in index-deletions 
 
Further analysis about passive ownership's effects on abnormal returns around deletions is 
included in Table 9 where various regressions have been run. The dependent variable in these 
models is either the anticipation window CAR (-50 to -35 days) or the total window CAR (-50 
to +50 days) at the stock level. Independent variables include some of the same variables as in 
H1 and H2 regressions, as well as the one-year market return (Russell 3000) prior to the deletion 
in question, the pure one-year return of the stock itself and six index dummies. The return 
variables have been adjusted so that they do not include any of the observations from the CAR 
periods in question. 
The results from these regressions support the evidence from Table 8 and Figure 5, i.e. that the 
effect of passivity on the realized CAR in the anticipation window is consistently negative 
across models and the effect is at least semi-strong in statistical sense with a t-value of -1.81 in 
Model 3, where a 1%-point added passive ownership predicts a higher negative anticipation 
CAR of -0.24%. This result gives further support to the possibility of more prominent smart 
money trading against stocks that have had a higher passive share, consistent with the notion 
that passive flows can cause prices to deviate from their fundamental values over longer time 
periods. Due to missing data in many of the key variables, the sample size in the regressions 
varies somewhat though.  
The mean results of passivity’s effect in the total window CAR are highly negative as well (-
0.29% to -0.40%) although they do not reach a very high statistical significance (t-values -0.99 
to -1.24).  
The regressions were also tested with year dummies outside of the results shown in Table 9 and 
the magnitude of the mean effects from the lagged level of passivity were unchanged, although 
the statistical significance decreased with new t-values being -1.2 and -1.0 for anticipation 
window and total window, respectively. The results of the regressions are thus not definitive 
but at least moderately support the third hypothesis of the thesis.   
The control variables improve the models and the most noteworthy ones are the previous 1-
year returns of the market and the stock itself and the size of the company.   
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Table 9: Passive ownership and the cumulative abnormal returns in index deletions 
 
If it truly is the case that the level of passive ownership is the factor behind the results found in 
Table 8 and Table 9 due to added passivity’s effect on corporate valuations, there are interesting 
implications about the most heavily indexed stocks still included in the indices. As the deleted 
stocks typically have smaller weights in the indices than the stocks that are still included, it 
implies that the deletions also have smaller levels of passive ownership than the rest. Thus, if 
the effects are of this magnitude and modestly significant for the deleted stocks, then it is 
Dependent variables:
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept -2.57 0.26 -11.96 -6.05 -12.98 -18.3
(-1.90) (0.03) (-0.98) (-1.88) (-0.51) (-0.62)
P_Own_Lagged -0.003 -0.17 -0.24 0.07 -0.29 -0.40
(-0.06) (-1.35) (-1.81) (0.55) (-0.99) (-1.24)
Russ_1y_Return -0.02 -0.35
(-0.51) (-3.44)
Stock_1y_Return 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.09
(2.13) (1.79) (1.12) (2.08)
P/B 0.10 -0.05
(0.64) (-0.13)
P/S 0.01 -0.00
(0.10) (-0.00)
ln(Market cap (m)) 2.45 2.44 7.78 7.00
(3.83) (3.32) (4.84) (3.93)
ln(Volume (t)) -1.32 -0.36 -3.60 -2.16
(-1.81) (-0.42) (-1.96) (-1.02)
Analysts -0.09 -0.13
(-0.70) (-0.39)
Index dummies 6 6 6 6 6 6
N 1 982 565 491 1 982 565 491
Adj. R
2 0.1% 10.7% 9.2% 2.3% 12.9% 12.1%
Anticipation window:
CAR -50 / -35
Total window:
CAR -50 / +50
The regressions are run for the whole time period of 2000 - 2017 which consists of a total of 1982 individual index deletions with data for the regressions. The indices 
included are: S&P 500 index, S&P 500 Growth index, S&P 500 Value index, S&P 400 Mid-Cap index, S&P 600 Small-Cap index, S&P 100 index and 
NASDAQ 100 index. The dependent variable is the firm-level cumulative abnormal return (return over the Russell 3000) over the specified period. P_Own_Lagged 
indicates the quarterly ownership-% of all passive funds out of total shares out for each company in the quarter prior to the deletion. P/B and P/S variables indicate 
firm-specific valuation metrics, calculated each quarter by dividing a firm's market cap with its realized book value of equity/revenue. Market cap is the natural 
logarithm of the quarter end market cap of a stock measured in millions. Volume is the natural logarithm of the amount of sells of a stock in a quarter, measured in 
thousands. Analysts are measured as the number of analysts giving yearly EPS estimates for a firm. Index dummies indicate the dummy variables for the 7 indices 
under analysis. Russell 3000 and stock returns are the 1-year simple returns prior to the index deletion effective date.  The number of observations is not stable in 
each model for there is lacking data for some variables, most notably the valuation metrics. The t-scores are calculated using robust standard errors.
Table 9: Passive ownership and the cumulative abnormal returns in index deletions
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plausible to think that the effects would perhaps be greater for stocks that have multiple times 
the passive flows and ownership compared to the deletion sample.  
However due to passivity’s popularity, by this assertion most of the market would be 
chronically overvalued which is a dangerous statement and one that is more or less impossible 
to prove ex-ante. For example, during the tech bubble an investor couldn’t argue with a high 
certainty that the market was overvalued because there were believable fundamentals such as 
the growth story, that could be used to explain the valuations. Similarly, even if there are 
chronic overvaluations currently due to passivity, other fundamentals such as low interest rates 
can be used by market participants to explain stock valuations. Also, recently Jeremy Siegel35 
(2018) noted how the fact that investors can now own diversified portfolios (through index 
funds) for a fraction of the cost that they used to pay historically, may be a meaningful factor 
in explaining why market valuations can be higher than before. The idea is that the equilibrium 
PE ratio for stocks may have been elevated by the amount that was previously paid out to 
brokers and other intermediaries when investing in stocks. Siegel’s notion does seem intuitive 
and it can be an important reason behind the findings in this thesis and in the research cited 
previously, but it may also be another seemingly important fundamental that can’t necessarily 
be tested properly just like many of the reasons used by practitioners in the tech bubble. In the 
end, it is thus only after the correction that we can explain market-wide inefficiencies with a 
higher confidence and sort out the meaningful fundamentals from the noise.  
The results in this paper are nevertheless in line with the previous findings of Morck & Yang 
(2001) and Belasco et al. (2011) regarding the detachment of indexed stocks and supportive of 
the decreased price efficiency -findings by Qin and Singal (2015) and the fact that the markets 
can’t be perfectly efficient in any case (Grossman and Stigliz, 1980). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
35 Siegel is a highly decorated professor currently teaching at the Wharton School of Business. 
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VI – Robustness and limitations 
 
 
The possibility of reverse causality in the regressions is low due to the nature of index funds 
and their investors. The possibility that realized skewness or negative deviation could drive the 
changes in passive ownership is low because cap-weighted funds only buy and sell stocks based 
on investor flows, i.e. they do not directly react to market movements. Once they replicate the 
index, they will always follow it approximately 1:1 unless they have investor flows and thus 
need to sell or buy stocks. Investor flows can of course drive the reverse causality, i.e. make 
subscriptions and redemptions as a result of market movements, but the flows tend to exhibit 
opposite patterns than what could explain the results: i.e. positive flows to any type of fund 
usually coincide with positive market returns (positive skewness) whereas negative flows 
coincide with negative returns (negative skewness). The result that an increase in passive 
ownership (positive flows) is associated with negative skewness is thus somewhat contradictory 
to the classical fund flow and returns chasing -studies and implies that the results are likely not 
due to reverse causality.  
One caveat is however, that for equally weighted index funds, the previously discussed reverse 
causality would apply: i.e. they own the index’s stocks with weights 1/n and if some stocks 
experience large negative returns, they buy them and sell their other holdings so that the 1/n 
weight is again reached. For these funds, highly negatively skewed returns would be associated 
with increased ownership but the causality would be reversed, i.e. skewness would lead to an 
increase in ownership. Thus, I had excluded these funds from my sample as was mentioned in 
the data-section. Also, the AS calculations of Cremers helped here for he had not calculated 
them using equal weight indices. Thus, none of the funds matched with Cremers dataset could 
be equally weighted, for equal weighted funds would have had a very large active share 
compared to cap weighted indices. It is still possible that some funds in my sample are equally 
weighted, but if so then these are certainly in the minority.  
Also, as the results also highly indicate that the lagged change of passive ownership is a 
significant predictor of future realized skewness and negative deviation, it is even more unlikely 
that there is a reverse causality driving the results, for it would imply that investor flows to 
passive index funds would somehow be affected by near-future realized tail-movements which 
tend to be impossible to predict.  
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The study contains a fair amount of robustness checks in the main results already by having 
multiple model specifications in each regression. However, the main regressions do not 
consider the possibility of multicollinearity among the passivity variables affecting the results 
(as shown by the correlations of the variables in Appendix B), which is why in Table 10 I run 
the idiosyncratic skewness -regressions separately for each variable. Table 10 further confirms 
the results in Table 3, indicating that the coefficients are separately as significant in magnitude 
and statistical significance as in the multivariable setting. Nevertheless, the fact that both the 
level and the changes are included in the models of Table 3 is important, for it is intuitive that 
there would be different effects that passive flows can have depending on what a stock’s status 
(i.e. the level of passivity) is in an index, and I thus consider those models to be more 
representative of passivity’s total effects on stock return characteristics. 
Finally, various other specifications have been tested outside of this paper but are not shown 
here due to passivity’s consistent effect throughout the results, further confirming the main 
models discussed in the results. 
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Table 10: Idiosyncratic skewness regressions with passivity variables individually 
 
 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Intercept 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.19 0.19 0.17
(22.91) (21.41) (19.60) (6.73) (6.58) (5.77)
P_Own -0.006 -0.006
(-8.94) (-6.12)
ΔP_Own -0.015 -0.024
(-4.48) (-5.54)
ΔP_Own_Lagged -0.010 -0.018
(-2.45) (-3.94)
Russ_Skewness -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.015 -0.014 -0.07
(-8.22) (-8.52) (-10.99) (-0.27) (-2.68) (-1.34)
P/B 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.007
(16.00) (13.12) (12.30) (13.40) (10.46) (9.61)
ln(Market cap (m)) -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
(-14.54) (-14.99) (-13.70) (-11.60) (-11.48) (-10.83)
Skewness_Lagged 0.00 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006
(0.36) (-0.54) (-0.70) (-1.45) (-2.32) (-2.27)
Stdev_Lagged 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.006 0.008
(10.99) (10.26) (10.66) (9.64) (8.63) (8.99)
EPS Surprise 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.20 0.18 0.18
(44.30) (38.83) (35.19) (43.95) (37.56) (34.96)
Number of time dummies** 71 71 71
Number of sector dummies** 25 25 25
N 163 179 128 826 118 267 163 179 128 826 118 267
Adj. R
2 1.6% 1.5% 1.5% 2.3% 2.3% 2.2%
** Most sector and time dummies are highly significant in all models. 
Table 10: Idiosyncratic skewness regressions with passivity variables individually
The regressions are run for the whole time period of 2000 - 2017 which consists of a total of 284 402 individual firm-quarter findings. Realized skewness is 
the Fisher-Pearson skewness during each quarter calculated from idiosyncratic returns. P_Own indicates the quarterly ownership-% of all passive funds out of 
total shares out for each company. ΔP_Own indicates the quarterly percentage point change in the ownership of passive funds for each stock in the sample. 
ΔP_Own_Lagged is the change during the previous quarter.  Russ_Skewness indicates the realized returns distribution descriptor for the Russell 3000 -index 
during each quarter. P/B indicates a firm-specific valuation metric, calculated each quarter by dividing a firm's market cap with its most recent realized book 
value of equity.  Market cap is the natural logarithm at the quarter end market cap of a stock measured in millions. EPS surprise is the relative surprise of the 
EPS released in the quarter being analyzed. Lagged variables are calculated from the observations of the previous quarter. Time and sector dummies indicate 
the amount of dummy variables in the model.  The number of observations is not stable in each model for there is lacking data for some variables, most notably 
the valuation metrics. The t-scores are calculated using robust standard errors.
Standard OLS regression (eq 5) Fixed-effects models (eq 6)Dependent variable: Realized Quarterly Idiosyncratic 
Skewness
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Limitations 
 
There are a few noteworthy limitations in the study. Most importantly, the exact level of passive 
ownership is impossible to calculate because of missing data on non-U.S. passive institutions, 
possible data gaps in the CRSP/CDA-structure and unknown investors that mirror passive 
vehicles through direct investments.  
Therefore, the regression results, i.e. “an x-basis point increase in passivity is associated with a 
y-basis point decrease in realized idiosyncratic skewness” are slightly biased in terms of size, 
but the direction of the coefficients shouldn’t be affected by this unless the missing sources of 
passivity data greatly deviate from the U.S. institutions in their trading patterns, which seems 
rather unlikely. The bias caused by missing data is also likely quite small for the fact that the 
funds included in the study should cover most of the passive money worldwide.  
The study also only covers U.S. listed stocks which implies that there may be some geographic 
bias driving the results. Therefore, further analysis in other markets such as Europe and Japan 
would be required. Japan especially could be an interesting candidate for the passivity levels 
are likely extremely high there due to the Bank of Japan’s monetary easing policies through the 
purchase of ETFs.  
There are also a lot of missing data points on many of the key variables used in the regressions, 
which is why the sample sizes are not stable across different model specifications, though this 
limitation’s effect is to some extent diminished by the fact that the sample sizes are still so large 
in many of the regressions. 
Another noteworthy limitation may be a model risk in the sense that a standard linear OLS -
setting may not be the mathematically correct way in regressing the third central moment, i.e. 
the skewness, which may be indicated by the low adjusted R-squared of the regressions, 
although the methodology used here and hence the low R-squared values does not differ from 
previous studies around realized skewness (Ben-David et al., 2017). Omitted variable bias is 
also a slight worry in the skewness regressions for the amount of studies around the subject is 
so limited to use as a reference point. 
Furthermore, the study only analyses the effects of passive ownership and flows but doesn’t 
have an input on how the active part of the markets interplays with the added passivity. 
Analysing the flows of active funds and for example the short interest on passivized stocks 
would be a meaningful addition to the study. 
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More minor limitations include the various ways of variable computation that have not been 
tested, such as the way in which stock returns, abnormal returns or skewness-measure can be 
computed and the different time periods of data that can be used. It is also possible that the 
corrections made to the passivity and the control variables that were discussed in the data 
section are insufficient. These issues and their significance has been discussed in more detail 
earlier however. 
 
 
VII – Conclusions and topics for further research 
 
 
In this thesis I study whether the current megatrend of the stock markets, passive investing, 
affects the characteristics of the stocks that they target and hence the accuracy of stock prices. 
The intuition behind the study is that any effect caused by passive institutions is non-
fundamental because their actions are not based on any firm or market analysis, hence causing 
decreased price-efficiency.  
Additionally, the fact that full or very high levels of passivity would likely lead to market 
breakdown raises questions: do we observe the negative effects incrementally or do they only 
appear once a critical threshold has been reached? I study the potential effects in two distinct 
ways: first by studying the quarterly flows by passive institutions and the changes in ownership 
at the stock level, where I test whether the flows and level of passive money alter the shape of 
a stock’s realized firm-specific returns distribution and whether there are firm-specific factors 
enhancing the effects, and second, by studying the potential latent long-term premiums 
associated with passive money via event study -methodology around index deletions.   
In the quarterly flow -analyses I found a statistically significant negative relation of added 
passivity and the current level of passive ownership on the realized firm-specific skewness of 
a stock. More specifically, the level of passive ownership decreases the quarterly realized 
idiosyncratic skewness by about 0.04 for each 10% out of total shares out owned by passive 
institutions, and that the realized skewness is further decreased by 0.01 – 0.02 for each 1% of 
shares outstanding purchased by the institutions in the same quarter and by a further 0.01 – 0.02 
in the subsequent one 
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Further analysis through negative deviation -analyses suggests that the level of ownership has 
a different nature in affecting the skewness than the flows of passivity, i.e. the level has a 
tendency to decrease tail movements overall and hence decrease skewness which supports the 
previous findings that stocks tend to behave more like the indices in which they are included, 
whereas the flows have a tendency of increasing left-tail movements, supportive of the 
hypothesis that passive flows are non-fundamental and may lead to reversals in stock prices. 
I.e. a 1%-point quarterly increase (flow) in passive ownership leads to an increase of 0.01 – 
0.05%-points in realized negative deviation in the same quarter and an additional 0.01 – 0.04%-
points in the subsequent quarter and that the level-coefficient predicts a decrease of around 
0.03% for 1%-point increase in the level of ownership. 
By grouping the sample with each firm’s respective ROE-measure, used to proxy for the 
fundamentals of a company, I found that firms with worse fundamentals tend to have larger 
reversals as a result of passive money. The results indicate that for firms which do poorly 
economically, the non-fundamental push of passive flows have a more prominent negative 
effect on stock price efficiency in the short-term and hence a higher reversal effect once the 
arbitrageurs correct the errors. The intuition behind this result is that the demand for stocks of 
poorly performing companies would be low without passive flows and thus the share of non-
fundamental demand out of the total demand is higher than what it would be for high 
performance stocks, thus leading to more prominent mispricings and corrections. 
From the event study -analyses I found that stock-deletions that have had more passive 
ownership in the prior quarter tend to have slightly larger and more significant negative effects 
as a result of the deletion, implying that passive flows may be affecting the long-term valuations 
of companies and that the arbitrageurs are limited in their ways of correcting the pricing errors. 
Furthermore, the most striking difference between more passive and less passive stock-
deletions was in the way in which the markets anticipate the deletion, where more passivized 
stocks have systematically larger reversals in the anticipation period. This indicates that 
arbitrageurs are willing to take larger bets on stocks that have more passive ownership, which 
is consistent with the idea that passive flows may be pushing the prices of stocks upwards as 
the popularity of indexing grows and forces non-fundamental buying pressure. Thus, there is 
evidence that a long-term “passivity premium” exists.   
The results combined suggest that non-fundamental flows induced by the growth in popularity 
of passive investing can affect the way in which stocks move towards efficient prices and the 
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effects may be quite sticky. Hence, it would seem that added passivity incrementally 
deteriorates the pricing efficiency for stocks, rather than acts as a binary variable over a certain 
threshold. For the future, this implies that if the current trend continues and passive vehicles 
gain large inflows while at the same time active investors face outflows, the potential pricing 
errors for heavily indexed stocks may increase. This poses an interesting game-theoretical 
problem caused by indexing: for individual investors it is most favourable to invest in passive 
funds regardless of the situation (as per Sharpe, 1991) but if everyone does it, market efficiency 
will break down and ultimately everyone will lose.   
The potential topics for future research around passive investing grow in parallel with its 
popularity: For example, can/do firms use the potential overvaluations in their favour by for 
example issuing new shares? Is this linked to index additions and deletions? How will the added 
passivity affect the most important decisions of individual companies that are usually put to 
shareholder vote? – I.e. as passive institutions target for low tracking error instead of 
maximizing returns, will they prefer to vote for the less volatile choices, and what happens once 
their ownership reaches the threshold of 50%, which represents a situation when they can in 
theory dictate how a company operates. Furthermore, how does the increase in smart beta -
fund’s popularity link to the popularity of the more simple passive products? For example, if 
we know that added passivity can alter market efficiency and the way in which stocks behave, 
then this can potentially create factors in the stock market which factor funds can then follow 
mechanically (momentum-funds would perhaps be a prime candidate for the analysis), further 
causing a inefficiencies in the market.  
Understanding the implications and effects that added passivity can have on the markets is 
perhaps one of the most important questions in finance at the moment, for the trend is so strong 
and the estimates predict extremely high levels of passive ownership already in the near future. 
The results in this thesis indicate incremental price efficiency deterioration -effects as a result 
of passivity and it is consistent with the findings in the papers by Morck & Yang (2001), 
Belasco et al. (2011) and Qin and Singal (2015). Nevertheless, further analysis around the 
subject is definitely needed to reach a more comprehensive conclusion.  
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix A – Passive fund -sample 
 
 
 
 
391 2994 8850 41073 46106 52877 57032 62164 68323 80428 80837 81141 82564 84899 88707
448 3091 8860 42040 46185 53281 57033 62168 69322 80429 80838 81142 82565 84900 88717
519 3120 9375 42539 46960 53282 57048 62170 69365 80430 80909 81143 82567 84901 89011
676 3169 11050 42543 47050 53617 57049 62171 72729 80431 80944 81161 82569 84902 89038
762 3196 13788 42544 47197 53708 57050 62181 72746 80432 80950 81162 82570 84903 89073
792 3306 14571 42545 47198 53750 57121 62217 72930 80433 80951 81169 82571 84904 89189
805 3307 15058 42547 47199 53751 57124 62219 72986 80434 80952 81173 82573 84905 89190
925 3370 15653 42548 47201 53784 57125 62242 72987 80435 80953 81174 82586 84906 89387
1085 3378 16489 42696 47393 53832 57131 62836 73204 80443 80954 81194 82596 84907 89464
1366 3519 16500 42700 48428 53912 57263 62837 73218 80461 80955 81195 82600 84908 89531
1394 4870 18004 42701 48459 53920 57328 62839 73271 80463 80956 81196 82601 84909 89683
1427 4956 18005 42702 48526 53930 57336 62982 73712 80469 80957 81197 82607 85262
1586 5105 20408 42703 48638 54018 57337 63069 75704 80547 80958 81198 82617 85344
1589 5171 20450 42737 48642 54299 57352 63121 75708 80548 80959 81199 82618 86283
1710 5195 20618 42738 48692 54440 57478 63155 75710 80558 80960 81200 82737 86328
1903 5378 21325 42739 48755 54460 57589 63603 75711 80559 80962 81201 82861 86330
1908 5451 21327 42784 49015 54665 57590 63702 75713 80560 80974 81202 82862 86389
1909 5677 21328 42808 49150 54747 57591 63704 75715 80561 80975 81213 82873 86602
1927 5705 21859 42809 49197 54843 57592 63836 75716 80562 80977 81304 82881 86883
1998 5715 21917 42810 49267 55710 57593 63837 75719 80570 81007 81428 82887 87010
2026 5759 23135 42819 49476 55785 57594 63838 75721 80590 81008 81449 82918 87587
2035 5794 23138 42921 49645 55811 57595 63839 75722 80591 81011 81454 82945 87588
2042 5803 23440 42956 50320 55829 57596 64087 75989 80592 81012 81594 82951 87590
2113 5806 26775 42957 50407 55865 57597 64309 76265 80622 81013 81638 83143 87592
2152 5941 26782 42974 50440 55965 57612 64346 76581 80624 81014 81639 83154 87593
2218 5991 26784 42993 50441 56301 57633 64381 77652 80699 81015 81640 83181 87698
2297 6149 28591 44054 50442 56305 57634 64687 77964 80717 81016 81646 83312 87701
2326 6200 28898 44055 50443 56342 57829 64725 78284 80718 81017 81669 83329 87703
2327 6220 28911 44056 50444 56347 58030 64728 78636 80719 81018 81681 83330 87704
2523 6223 28944 44057 50445 56590 58031 64861 78653 80720 81019 81682 83336 87705
2547 6232 28984 44058 50446 56611 58032 64863 78665 80721 81020 81683 83341 87706
2550 6334 29181 44061 50493 56762 58037 64887 78674 80751 81034 81684 83353 87707
2554 6391 30732 44245 50959 56763 58892 64903 78679 80753 81042 81685 83369 87708
2559 6485 30797 44276 51131 56769 58893 64918 78687 80754 81044 81686 83377 87709
2586 6623 30878 44278 51143 56771 58953 64938 78698 80755 81065 81692 83378 87711
2609 6626 30906 44282 51157 56772 59242 64961 78717 80756 81083 81697 83385 87712
2627 6627 30907 44283 51528 56773 59243 65260 79197 80757 81084 81783 83395 87713
2637 6628 32275 44709 51555 56774 59346 66594 79423 80758 81088 81803 83396 87714
2638 6630 32503 44776 51610 56776 59571 66774 79968 80759 81089 82031 83397 87716
2648 6631 34218 45073 51619 56790 59622 66840 79970 80760 81091 82219 83401 87717
2676 6632 35483 45281 51640 56804 59718 66845 79991 80761 81092 82434 83425 87718
2677 6634 35485 45282 51715 56805 59911 67015 79992 80769 81093 82487 84017 87719
2705 6750 36450 45404 51801 56807 60026 67040 80205 80770 81094 82528 84210 87746
2708 6752 36550 45650 51836 56810 60027 67229 80210 80771 81095 82543 84293 87831
2800 7571 37527 45668 51943 56813 60560 67499 80212 80772 81117 82558 84892 88171
2839 7598 37696 45669 51951 56871 61412 67519 80213 80773 81121 82559 84894 88218
2844 7599 37871 45671 51952 56881 61830 67520 80380 80774 81135 82560 84895 88300
2932 7679 38418 45761 52100 56883 61886 67992 80382 80811 81138 82561 84896 88515
2934 7995 39977 45921 52150 56906 61943 67996 80396 80824 81139 82562 84897 88519
2942 8781 39978 45947 52651 57013 62160 67999 80399 80825 81140 82563 84898 88704
CDA codes for the whole sample of passive funds 2000 - 2017, N=711
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Appendix B – Distributions and correlations of the main variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distribution of ΔP_Own 
pre-adjustments
Distribution of ΔP_Own 
post-adjustments
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Correlation matrix of the main variables 
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Appendix C – Residual plots of main regressions 
 
IRS regression Model 3 
 
Residual distribution 
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IRS regression Model 6 
 
Residual distribution 
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